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Environm ental

Studies

Permit Value: A Hidden Key to the Public Land Grazing Dispute (129pp.)
Director: Bill Chaloupka
This study examines the extent and importance of the real estate market value
(permit value) of Forest Service grazing permits and Bureau of Land
Management grazing leases. This value is not officially recognized by either
agency, although it does influence the IRS calculation of inheritance taxes
since it is considered to increase the total assessed value of a ranch. Permit
value is traced through its historical and legal development. The theories as to
why this value exists are explored. The numerous economic studies that have
attempted to enumerate permit value in a specific region or trace the total
extent of permit value throughout the 11 Western states are collected and their
methods and results are discussed.
Informal interviews and surveys were conducted with forty-three
individuals who have varying connections to the current political conflict
over public land grazing. These interviews focused on discussing the political
and economic importance of permit
value in an attempt to assess the political
viability of various proposed new management
tools. These individuals
included ranchers, both with and without grazing allotments, public land
managers, academics, environmental activists, bankers, a Realtor and a
newspaper reporter. Results showed that it is generally acknowledged that
these permits and leases do have real estate value. More than two-thirds felt,
that this value had at least a significant influence on ranchers' opposition to
grazing level reductions. Most felt that some new management tools would be
helpful and more than half supported, to various degrees, plans to compensate
ranchers for reductions in their grazing privileges or options to buy-out
allotm ents entirely.
Various issues that affect public land grazing and which need to be
considered when examining new management tools are discussed and then
some new management plans are discussed. Finally, a hybrid proposal is
offered that might make grazing reforms more politically viable by
considering and compensating ranchers for permit value as their permitted
stocking rates are reduced or voluntarily eliminated.
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CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING PERMIT VALUE:
One step towards a solution

INTRODUCTION:

Why

the

controversy?

Often overshadowed by the more intense debates and struggles involving
logging on National Forests or mining in ,the public domain, the debate over
grazing on public land seems to phase in

and out of the media's eye. But

gradually, grazing has become more and

more of an issue for both

environmentalists and the public. What is

at stake is the health and

use of over

285 million acres of public land. These lands are loosely controlled by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service, but used, often
intensely, by ranchers for their cows, sheep and horses.
The problems surrounding that use are rooted in the economic and political
structures that often allow overgrazing to continue, and surface as ecological
bruises and scars. Overgrazing can lead to the loss of native grasses, the
invasion of exotic plant species including noxious weeds, wildlife decline
through loss of floral cover and habitat,, erosion of topsoil, problems with
forest regeneration

or increased fuel load, streambank shearing,

stream

widening and loss o f function, desertification through water table decline,
stream sedimentation and the loss of fish spawning areas and the subsequent
decline of fish populations.
Economically, low grazing fees for the use of these lands are called
government subsidies by some, and necessity by others, who see many
ranches barely surviving and worry about the effects of their loss to. western
communities and landscapes. Politically, despite some common ground in the

1
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and varying definitions of "caring for the land" tend to divide people on the
issue into a spectrum between the pro-extraction extremes of the Wise Use
movement, and the "No Compromise" extremes of the environmental
m o v e m e n t.
Currently, this split comes to light in the controversy taking place in many
western states over the use of school lands for grazing. Environmentalists are
arguing, with increasing success, that nonranchers should be able to bid on
state grazing permits. The intent of the environmentalists, if successful, is to
pay the state for the privilege of not grazing these lands. They would rest the
land from livestock grazing, maintaining its flora for wildlife habitat and
forage. Environmentalists argue that the states are legally bound to consider
their bids because of constitutional requirements to maximize the long-term
profits from the school land. Although the court battles continue, after years
of agency petitioning and legal battles, the Forest Guardians were awarded the
right to rest one state-controlled allotment that was abandoned by the rancher
in 1996, and a second after outbidding a rancher by 50 an acre in 1997.1
Not surprisingly, ranchers are threatened by these bids on state lands, and
not simply because of the impact of the loss of a few state grazing leases to a
few ranchers. Undoubtedly they are even more worried about the public's
perception of grazing if the state determines that grazing leases are not the
best long-term use of public land. Ranchers are also worried, with good
reason, about how these rulings and their ramifications will affect the use of
federal lands. Although the federal government is not required to maximize
profit from the land it leases, one of the reforms proposed by Secretary of
Interior Bruce Babbitt's proposed

"Rangeland Reform

'94"

(henceforth

1 The details of the Forest Guardians' successful bid were learned through a
telephone conversation with their employee Sam Hitt on 4/15/98.

3
abbreviated "RR '94") would allowed ranchers (or other who came to control
federal allotments) to rest their allotments. This facet of the proposed reforms,
along with a few others, has been taken to court and a final ruling is still
p e n d in g .
The public land ranching community's resistance to reforms is based on
several concerns: that the total land base available for ranching will diminish;
that reforms

will economically

impact both individual ranchers

and ranching

communities; that ranches will fail and get sold to developers, resulting in a
loss of open spaces; that grazing fees will climb, impacting yearly operations;
and that the flora on allotments that are not grazed will become decadent, and
prone to fire. These concerns are compounded by a fear that the price for
ranches will continue to climb in many areas due to development trends that
are pushing up land values. This could eliminate some old ranches, and
decrease the likelihood of any new ranches.
For ranchers, the July, 1997 decision by the US Fish & Wildlife Service that
declared 599 miles of Arizona's, New Mexico's and California's stream banks as
critical habitat for the southwestern willow flycatcher, along with the
expected restrictions resulting from that declaration, are even more scary.
Once again, as was not uncommon in the last 20 years, ranchers and
environmentalists will end up in court, with federal agencies in the middle.2

2 The following enlightening snapshot comes from the e-mail news service
GREENLines Issue #424, July 17, 1997, greenlines@ envirolink.org:
"RANCHERS TO SUE: The New Mexico Public Lands Council, representing
3,500 ranchers in the state, filed a notice of intent to sue several federal
agencies if restrictions on grazing in riparian areas are approved, according
to a Santa Fe New Mexican article. The Council is acting in response to a
notice of intent to sue [the agencies] by the Santa Fe group Forest Guardians
for failing to protect the southwestern willow flycatcher and nine other
threatened species from grazing. The ranchers argue that grazing may
benefit the flycatcher. Forest Guardian's John Horning replies that, 'as long
as they continue denying they're part of the problem, we'll end up in court.'"

With this most recent round, contesting habitat needs for a growing number
of endangered species, the stakes are getting higher, as the grazing
management provisions in the Forest Plans from eleven separate National
Forests are under dispute.^
Ranchers have felt the pinching and pruning of these court cases for years,
never knowing whose allotment will be cut back next, usually with no
compensation. Many fear an eventual end to public land grazing. Although
that is unlikely to happen any time soon, the cry, "Cattle Free in '93 "4 from
many environmentalists still echoes in many a rancher's ear, perhaps also
rekindling a more distant remembrance of the early moves to completely end
grazing on the original forest reserves.
Despite these continued clashes, a counter development has attempted to
bring ranchers and environmentalists to the same table. In some cases, such
as the BLM's Resource Advisory Councils (RACs), they come to discuss each
others concerns and to try to find some common ground that will allow the
agencies to work with both more easily. In other areas, such as the Gray
Ranch in New Mexico, or the Tipton Ranch in Nevada,^ ranchers are working
with environmental groups on plans that emphasize ecologically based range
management. Many more ranchers are attempting to do their best to show the
public that ranching does not always destroy the land, and can at times help
3 "The Southwest Center has warned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that it
will be sued if it backs down on draft opinion that the Southwest!s eleven
National Forest Plans jeopardize seven threatened and endangered species
with extinction." From the Southwest Center For Biological Diversity's
7/17/97, "SOUTHWEST BIODIVERSITY ALERT #83."
4 Although I have not been able to trace the prigin of - this slogan, it may have
come from Edward Abbey. Nevertheless, it is commonly used by both
environm entalists and ranchers who write about the controversy.
5 As documented in Dan Dagget's, Beyond the Rangeland Conflict: Towards a
West that Works. Layton, Utah: Gibbs-Smith, 1995.
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rehabilitate it. Although many environmentalists are truly pleased by these
efforts, others cannot help but point out negative statistics. For example, they
often note that 66% of the riparian habitat in BLM allotments is not in Proper
Functioning Condition (USDI, BLM). Thus, the political and legal battles
c o n tin u e .
So* in the midst of this controversy over public land grazing, is there any
way to make significant political progress on these issues? It is unrealistic to
suggest that the groups involved will ever reach consensus, but it may be that
one important element of that debate remains largely overlooked by
environmentalists and lawmakers, and even in part by the public lands
ranchers that it most effects. That missing element may be fundamental to
understanding

the ranchers' resistance to changes in the management of

public land grazing. It may be that a clear understanding and fair
consideration of the importance of that element may ease the conflict and
allow politicians and land managers to develop new options that allow for
progress in this hundred year debate. These new options could both ease the
ecological concerns of environmentalists and the economic concerns

of

ranchers. This important hidden element, permit value, is the. focus of this
th e sis.

GRAZING FEES: A MISPLACED FOCUS?
j

In a quick perusal of works on the history, politics or economics of public
land grazing, the overwhelming impression would be that the dominant theme
is the debate over grazing fees.^

Clearly there is much truth to that

impression. That impression would surely be tempered by the growing
6 For historic background to the grazing fee debate, see the work of Calif,
Clawson, Rowley, Paul Roberts, and Foss' Politics and Grass.

importance

of environmental issues, but often even

environm entalists

get

caught up in. the grazing fee debate. To some, the phrase, "low grazing fees are
f
subsidies" becomes a mantra, for it works to bring the public's attention to an
environmental issue by having them look at where their tax dollars are going.
At least part of the academic interest

in the debate over fees is because of its

complexity. They raise many questions: Should

fees be charged at all? How

should fee levels be determined? Are ranchers being subsided through low
grazing fees? Are: low grazing fees costing taxpayer money? How do grazing
fees relate to ranch prices? Do low grazing fees stabilize rural communities?
The academic debate then filters out to the public, who usually look to the
bottom

line.

Throughout this varied debate, however, it is usually assumed that the fee
itself is of paramount importance, The fee level does affect both the
profitability of the ranch, and how much of the government's expenses for
monitoring and maintaining the grazing program are recovered. Part of that
fee-level debate, centers on whether the fee represents the fair market value
of the forage the lease provides. Also, it is often argued that increased fees will
put

small ranches

out of business. What is not often asked, however, is if there

are

any equally important and possibly

more fundamental issues that

contribute to making the fee debate so central.

WHAT IS PERMIT VALUE?
To clearly understand permit value, it is necessary to have a clear
understanding of the benefits that leasing a public land grazing allotment
have to a ranching operation. The fundamental benefit is that such a lease
provides a source of relatively secure forage that allows the operation to run

7
more cattle. Although allotment "*AUMs7 do occasionally get cut, only in rare
instances do whole

allotments get canceled. Generally a ranch can count

on

this increase in forage to remain secure for at least ten years. In most cases, as
long as they follow the legal requirements of their leases, they can keep their
leases for decades. In some areas, forage from allotments is also difficult to
replace, simply because the surrounding pastures are in use. This makes
ranchers feel dependent on their allotments. Further, even if it is available,
replacement forage is usually

more expensive than running stock on

an

allotment. This is especially true in cases where the allotment abuts or is close
to the ranch.
The question then becomes, "How real is that feeling of dependency?"
Everyone

admits

that the fee for

the fees charged to
ranchers should not

using federal allotments is clearly less than

lease private allotments. Many thus argue that the
be subsidized and the fee should be increased. Others

argue that although the fees are lower on public lands, the total costs to the
rancher for public and private forage are actually on par, if such factors as
the required transportation, labor and equipment are considered. This
controversy is important to recognize, but will not be resolved in this work.
If the total costs to a ranching operation are less per animal for a ranch
' with a federal allotment, then

there i s . clearly a benefit of having an

allotment. Even if the average totalcosts of public

and private forage are

nearly equal, there are other benefits that are less obvious. Looking at the
microeconomics of ranching

operations, a larger operation

will usually have a

greater total income and a greater total profit. Often, through economies of
7 An AUM, or Animal Unit Month, defines either the amount of forage
consumed by one cow, one cow and a calf, or six sheep in one month or the
length of stay of the same animals in a defined area. This term is usually used
in reference to leased areas, including federal grazing allotments.
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scale, larger operations also have more profit per unit of livestock, since, some
costs remain nearly constant despite changes in the size of the ranch.
Although the degree of their influence is debated, in almost all cases
allotments clearly provide some increase to. the yearly profit of a ranching
o p e ra tio n .
Permits become valuable through the combination of . all these benefits, and
that value becomes

marketable because permits are consistently

transferred

with the sale of a ranch. Although definitions of permit value vary slightly,
for this thesis permit value is defined as the difference between the real estate
value of a ranch without its attached allotment(s) and the real estate value of a
ranch with its allotment(s). The actual calculation of permit value for an
allotment is complicated, since permit value fluctuates with many factors,
including changes in grazing fee levels, possible changes to the AUM level of
the allotment, the season of use for the allotment, the degree o f security that
the allotment will remain with the ranch, the ranch's geography and ecology,
the general productivity of the ranch and allotment, and local trends in ranch
real estate values.

WHY STUDY PERMIT VALUE?
Many environmentalists and lawmakers are not even aware that permit
value exists. Others are aware of it but focus on the grazing fee controversy or
ecological concerns. Some environmentalists that I talked to, influenced by
their belief that permit value has no legal basis, blind themselves to the
significance that permit value has for ranchers. They do this despite the fact
that in some cases it more than doubles the base (deeded) value of a ranch. In
either case, those who are aware of it have failed to educate the public oh its
significance. M ost ranchers with allotments are undoubtedly aware of the

economic importance of permit value, but for good reasons, few seem to make
an issue of it. They choose instead to fight for the notion that grazing
allotments are

a property right, or emphasize the controversy over fee

levels,

imploring politicians to keep them low in order to maintain the stability of the
public lands ranchers. This tactic, however, gets little sympathy from those
who see low fees as a subsidy. Those who believe in these subsidies often do not
really care about the debate over total costs, or how it affect ranchers, for as
taxpayers what they care about is that the costs of managing the federal
allotment system is considerably more than the sum that grazing fees bring
in .
Ranchers might do better to be more open about the whole economic system
of public land grazing. A clear explanation of permit value might gain or at
least maintain

public sympathy, especially if some ranchers have the courage

to admit that they have become stuck with a large investment in an allotment
that is not very profitable, or has become more valuable for other public uses.
These ranchers must be more flexible, and at least willing to listen to new
politically

broad-based

land management options.
and

Ranchers

must recognize

that the West

is changing

in the long run, they cannot realistically hold

the acreage or

AUMs that they currently do, in the face of the creeping forces

of increasing population, growing demands for recreation on public lands,
and increasing
In return,

recognition of wildlife habitat needs.
environmentalists must face up to the historical and political

reality that it is unlikely that public lands ranching will end in the near
future. They must work with the ranchers who are willing to change, and be
willing to give

some social and economic considerations to the

long years of

investment and

sentimental use that ranchers have in public lands. They

continue in their attempt to chip away at the hardened allotment system

can
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through costly and

time consuming appeals and legal battles, or they

can try

to work towards finding real, long-term solutions. If they attempt the latter,
understanding permit value will surely help.
The reality is that without a significant political or judicial shift, the
struggle over public land ranching in the West will continue. That struggle
can be

painful

andprotracted, or may be transformed into a rational debate

that searches for equity and fairness. It is my hope that the exploration of
permit value that follows, along with the concluding recommendations, will
lead to some real attempts for more flexible and equitable grazing management
systems, that both

benefit the environment, and are fair to ranchers.

A PREVIEW OF WHAT FOLLOWS
This thesis looks closely at permit value in an attempt to redefine the
century-long debate over public land grazing. It postulates that there is a
marketable real estate value to public land grazing allotments (hitherto .
referred to as permit value), that there is a fundamental tie between
fees and permit value, that permit

value is one

grazing

of the two biggest reasons why

ranchers often resist cuts to their public land grazing allotments'

AUM levels8

and other restrictive changes i n . allotment management. It then finds that

1

ultimately, the issue of permit value must be addressed before any serious
attempt to resolve the conflicts over public land grazing will bring even
partial closure to the debate over public land grazing.
Chapter Two traces the historical background of the development of permit
value: How did it come into being? This history is by no means comprehensive,
and only touches briefly on the already well documented extensive debate over
8 The other, primary reason is the stabilizing effect of the yearly economic
benefits that a ranching operation incur by having a grazing allotment.

grazing allotment fee levels.^ Aside from fee levels, any law or event that
changes AUM levels would directly influence permit values, as would any law
or regulation that influences that existence or stability of permits. Thus, this
history focuses on the debates, political trends, and legal issues that have
influenced, or have the potential to influence, fee levels, AUM levels, or the
stability of the allotment system. These include factors such as new
environmental and land management laws along with related lawsuits, the
"Sagebrush Rebellion” and its roots, the more recent grazing bills introduced
\

by Senator Domenici and Representative Smith, fluctuations in the price of
beef, and changes in land use patterns.
Chapter Three starts with a discussion of appraisal techniques and various
theories proposed in the literature on the economic basis of permit value and
the true costs of grazing on allotments. It then assembles the results of recent
economic studies that assess the extent of permit value, i.e. how valuable is
each additional AUM to the real estate value of a ranch. It also looks at the
methods used in these studies to determine this value, including further
discussion of the relationship between grazing fee levels and permit value.
Finally, it attempts to explain some of the variations in those results.
Chapter Four reports the results of an informal survey the author conducted
through

interview s

with forty-three people

who are intim ately

concerned

with the issue of public land grazing. These people include ranchers, both
with and without federal allotments, federal land managers, professors,
environmentalists, bankers, a Realtor and a reporter. The interviews were
conducted in an attempt to assess the practical and political importance of
permit value in the debate over public land grazing.
9 See Calif (57), Culhane (246-252), Foss Politics and Grass, Libecap (49, 81), and
K ittred g e .
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The focus of these interviews was on assessing the importance of permit
value and on getting responses to new management options that would
compensate

ranchers for forces AUM reductions, or

allow voluntary

retirement of allotments for compensation. The discussion of the results of
these interviews also attempts to fit the interviewees' perspectives on permit
value into a larger picture of the practical and philosophical views on public
land grazing. It does this by comparing their perspectives on permit value
with other related issues of importance, including ranch viability, grazing fee
levels, retaining open spaces, land prices, maintaining viable wildlife habitat,
maintaining rural communities, and the role of

the

federal government.

Chapter Five discusses various issues affecting public land grazing that need
to be considered when examining new management tools. Then some new
allotment management options are discussed that could potentially mitigate the
economic impacts to the ranchers from AUM reductions and the resulting loss
of permit value. The goal of some of these options is to reduce the resistance of
the ranching community
habitat for

to AUM reductions that aim

to increase critical

wildlife and improve stream and riparian function.

Many of these possibilities were discussed with the interviewees, to assess
their political and practical viability. After a final assessment of the
importance of permit value in the public land grazing debate, in Chapter Six a
recommendation is made that includes an outline of the integral components
of some new management options that might be successful if incorporated into
new

legislation.

CHAPTER 2
A HISTORY OF PERMIT VALUE
-T- Grazing control on the National Forests was the most
revolutionary force striking the western livestock
industry since its modern beginning. It cut abruptly
across a manner of living, with all its freedoms, which
had evolved during the frontier era.
Paul H. Roberts

A CONFLICT IN IDEOLOGIES
The debate over public land grazing is just a part of a conflict in ideologies
prevalent

throughout the history of the West. Even before the Forest Service

first imposed regulatory control of grazing, there were philosophical, legal
and

even personal conflicts over public land grazing. Underlying the

debate

over grazing was the question o f whether the land remaining in the public
domain should be privatized. The creation of the forest reserves polarized
these two camps, as it reversed the long-standing policy of privatizing the
frontier, and was opposed by many in the West.
In regards to grazing, two basic philosophies emerged. The first is kin to the
"use it or lose it" philosophy of western water rights and the "first in time,
first in rights" philosophy of western miners. The second philosophy espoused
the conservationist belief that public land should be used for the benefit of the
public as a whole, and thus the use of forage through the grazing permit and
lease systems are only a temporary privilege that can be revoked at any time.
These two philosophies have manifested in legal conflicts over numerous
different issues regarding public land grazing, including the issue of permit
value. Looking to understand

why litigation over grazing is so common,

Michael Borman and Douglas

Johnson note Judge Burns' remarks in the

13

14
decision on the famous NRDC v. Hodel case that require NEPA assessments of
BLM allotments:
He noted, however, that the reason for the large scale judicial intrusion
into these areas has been the inability or unwillingness of the other
branches, both state and federal, to provide solutions to significant
societal, environmental, and economic problems. We expect that
litigation will continue and these legal "masters" will shape land use
policies in the future.
Considering that many important issues are still in court, I suspect this legal
"shaping" will continue. These include environmental efforts such as
Secretary of Interior Babbitt's RR '94 measures and initiatives from
environmental groups to lease state allotments. On the side of ranchers, Wayne
Hage,

author of

Storm Over Rangelands:

Private Rights in Federal Lands,

continues to promote their cause in his case over water and grazing rights.
Also, if the

courts continue to redefine "takings," a new definition mayhave

an influence

of the legal status of permit value, although as of yet thecourts

have continued to deny its legal existence.
It is not in the scope of this work to pass judgment on either these
philosophies or

their legal

or judicial implications. They are presented

only to

provide background and depth to the attitudes and ideas of

the people centrally

involved in the

is in their eyes

issues that are explored in later chapters. It

and minds that the value and influence of grazing permits

becomes a powerful

economic, political and ecological force.

EARLY CONFLICTS OVER GRAZING REGULATION
During
unused open

the nineteenth century,

the users of public land forage found vast

spaces that they grew accustom to using at no cost. They

gradually came to believe that this use was a right. Even after permit systems
were instituted, first in the forest reserves (that later became the National
Forests) and then on the lands that ended up being controlled by the BLM,
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instead of feeling they had a right to the open range, ranchers developed an
expectation that their

permits would continue intact. They transferred their

belief in a "right to graze" on the open range into a belief they had a right to
their

grazing

permits.

In 1891, when the forest reserve were first created, the status of grazing in
the reserves was not made clear, but quickly became an issue that unified
western livestock interests. Meanwhile, under the leadership of John Muir,
the influence of those opposing grazing grew. It is now largely forgotten that
in 1894, three years after the reserves were first established, all grazing was
officially excluded from the reserves. This proclamation, however, was
extensively

ignored, largely because there was no enforcem ent mechanism.

Years of studies, debate, and lobbying ensued. Grazing was partially
reinstated in 1897, by the Pettygrove Amendment to an appropriations bill,
despite the recommendation of the Forest Committee that had been formed at
the request of Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith. The Department of the
Interior stopped sheep

grazing on the reserves again in 1899, after just

one

year of regulation. Regulation was seen as a failure, but sheep grazing was
reinstated that autumn after extensive political pressure
Congressmen

from

Northwestern

(Rowley 4-30).

This debate over grazing on the reserves even led to a split in the supporters
of the forest reserves, after conservationists Gifford Pinchot and Albert Potter
advocated a system o f regulated grazing in the reserves, much to the dismay of
preservationist John Muir, who advocated an end to all grazing, at least of
sheep, on the reserves. Since that time, it has largely been the
preservationists' influence that has continued to advocate reductions in
grazing levels. Indeed

they have had some success, particularly in clearly

overgrazed areas, where their efforts are occasionally joined by the
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conservationists.
traditions

Elements

of. both

the conservationist and preservationist

remain in the modern environmental movement, although

the lines

are not always clear. The preservationists, however, stimulated by expanding
population and increased recreation use throughout the West, have in many
ways become more persistent, and thus become more threatening to ranchers,
especially ranchers who feel most strongly that they have a right to continue
using

their

grazing

allotments.

Confusion over the final status of grazing on the reserves continued to
ensue until the regulation of the forest reserves was transferred to the
Department of Agriculture in 1905. Between 1905 and 1906 the regulations
were extensively revised. A three tiered preference system for permits was put
in place • and fees were recommended for the 1906 season. Preference was
given first to ranchers who owned land adjacent to the reserves, next to those
who owned land near the reserves, and finally to transient herders with no
local property (Rowley 53-59).* ®
This system was challenged in court, by those who questioned whether the
agencies had a right to enforce regulations that were not specifically adopted
by Congress. In 1911, the same year that the reserves were renamed National
Forests, the Supreme Court decided two precedent-setting cases, United States v.
G rim a u d and L ig h t v. United Stares. Both affirmed that the Secretary of
Agriculture did have the constitutional power to regulate the use of public
lands for grazing, with the G r im a u d case making it clear that the agency also
had the power to institute grazing fees.

1 6 For an extensive history of the debate over grazing in the forest reserves
and the National Forests, see Rowley's U.S. Forest Service Grazing and
Rangelands: A History. Texas A&M, 1985.
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The L ig h t case is of special interest since it pits state versus federal rights.
Fred Light thought that it was the government's duty to follow Colorado law,
which puts the onus on landowners to exclude cattle from their property. Thus
he believed it was the duty of the Forest Service to put up a fence to keep his
cattle from wandering into the forest that bordered the open range near his
land. The Supreme Court ruled that the United States did not have to follow
Colorado law, and that Light was required to get a permit if his

cattle were

grazing on public land. Thus, he was not free to knowingly allow his

cattle to

wander into the forest boundary.
Numerous other court cases, including the Supreme Court decision
Omaechevarria

v. Idaho in 1918, have found that grazing on public land is not

a vested right, even if a permit has been acquired and held for years. The
issue, however, is not completely, clear. In 1890, an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Buford v. Houtz, seemed to have ruled that ranchers had an implied
license to graze public land. As Wayne Hage summarizes the case, "Mr. Houtz
argued that the government of the United States had known of this use, had
never forbidden it, nor taken any steps to arrest it, but had consented to and
encouraged it." While that is all true, it is important to note that the
government's "consent" was passive a n d . really only applied to

lands

unoccupied and not designated for other purposes.

THE ORIGINS OF PERMIT VALUE
Historically, access to the open range had value to ranchers, but permit
value as presented here could not have existed before the Forest Service began
instituting the permit system. Before that time stockmen could

freely graze on

all public lands. With the new allotment system, notwithstanding any court
decisions, ranchers

quickly recognized that grazing permits

legitimized

the
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value of the open, range, and a kind of black market developed to buy and sell
th e m .
The earliest actual documentation of the existence of permit value that I
have found in an extensive search of academic literature, is in a little known
work written in 1913 by Will C. Barnes, "Western Grazing Grounds and Forest
R anges."'H e notes how the early permit system in the forest reserves gave
great preference to ranchers and settlers who had established land ownership
near them, and that this preference virtually eliminated the migrant or
"tramp" stockman. Barnes' description of these preferences in the early
permit system also shows how they vary from the now familiar ten year
inheritable

leases. Most of the permits

were yearlong, renewed in the spring,

and were not supposed to be salable and transferable—even to heirs.
Although Barnes states, "The object of these regulations is to prevent
speculation in permits and the handing

down of grazing privileges

from one

person to another without the power of the Government [sic] to control it,"
(219) he also explains the obvious loopholes in that system. If both the stock
and "such

necessary ranch property asis clearly commensurate with' the

number of stock involved" were sold as a unit, then the permit could be
renewed to the purchaser— and presumably it usually was. He cites cases
"where sheep grazing under permit on a Forest [sic] have been sold for as
much as $2 per head more than the market value, solely because the ranch
which went with

the purchase controlled the range in National Forest" (218).

That $2 per head

is the permit value, but what is not clear from

this single

source is how often these combined stock and land purchases occurred, or
what the average

permit value was in that era.

The central question from
"Why are

this early scenario remains with us even today:

ranchers willing to pay more for

ranches with grazing permits?"
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Figure 1:

Leases listed in classified ads for early grazing
a llo tm e n ts .

Ranch for
Safe
160-acre ranch, 5 miles
from
railroad
station.
Joins forest reserve and
good range. 75 acres in
timothy and alfalfa. Fair
buildings.
Ideal small
stock or dairy ranch.

Price $4500—Terms
Collins Realty Go.
Helena, Mont.

TSX FINEST RANCH Is th e w o t tor you
tnutsee* m en an d form er* who have St
s o d w ont s place to c ls r . Zfcer s n d 13-th.
tro u t an the piece. Elk. b ear end m o u n tsln
lakes w ithin saddle h o n e distance. T h e
location Is perfect. M mile* tra m W est
Yellowstone. Very little wind o r snow .
OU road, schools sn d railro ad w ithin a m ile.
Y oar tam U r will like I t hare, F our-bedroom
house, new In 1M& com plete w ith law n,
trees, flowers and ahraba. X re rr convenionce. bath, electricity a n d furnace. T h is
plsee Is suited for fin e horses o r cattle. MO
acre* and 130 head forest perm it. 130 ac re s
under th e ditch In alfalfa an d tim othy a n d
closer hay. R unning stream th ro a a h e a r .
rals. lota of tree Irrigation w ater. Dttrlm s.
fences, c o rra ls ' and buildInss a re In A*1
shape. One owner h as spent 3S y ears In*.
proTinc u n s place a n d I t's th a show P laca
of th e d istrict. T he p rice u 123.300. B a rr y
Y. Corning, (3* Cook a r e . Bflltngi. M e at.

Montana Farmer Stockman
10/1 5 /4 6 , p.36
3.3SS ACHX8 deeded land; M0 a e r a T a t lo r
land, 130 seres sta te land, 1 artesian wells,
3 windmill wells. • dam s, lire creek n u t .
n in e through re ach , fenced a n d ow es
fenced, m ostly wo re n wire. 100 acres o k
falls, M. acres under eaM rutfon. TO acre*
crested w heat. O n m all route, on* m ile
from eehooL About fto ta n a o f hay. P rfoe
t1 .H p e r ac re Including hay, o r IS p e r
acre including h a r , horses, m achinery,
haase-hold goods, ete. Im provem ents fas.
excellent shape, w ater fas house (good. w ell).
Im m ediate possession. 30 percent down, b o k
once In sm all annual paym ents. 10U bend
cattle possibly to r lease. Melvin K . H orton ,
R anch Creek. H ont.

Montana Farmer Stockman
7 /1 5 /4 7 , p.36

J
For Sale—Ranch
$60,000

Helena Independant 1 1 /9 /1 9 , p7
ran RANCH.

713 acres deeded lan d . 3M acres
eultlvatad. S3 acres of sum m er faliow ln*
e n d h ay goes; about 60 tons of tim o th y a n a
olover. P rice 630,000. T erm s c a n be h a d .
H elson-M rera Agency, B o s <13, U rin g stssh
. M ontana.

|
;
;
!
1

Montana Farmer Stockman
1 0 /1 5 /4 6 , p.36

A - l R E L J . V q t n S H S f E . V T tor s o l e In w ell lj 4.100 A a c r e s o f D e e d e d (and,
n e t t l e d c o u n t r y . G o o d w a t e r . S ix m ile s
f r o m t i m b e r . 1 m ile f r o m r e s e r v e . A d 
700 A c r e s o f S c r i p l a n d
d r e s s , B o x 174 T r i b u n e .

j

30.000 A c r e s o f L e a s e d l a n d svitli u n l i m i t e d u n o c c u p i e d r a r f g e a d 
joining.

Great Falls Tribune

i 400 a c r e s a r u ^ u u d c r d i t c h
b u i l d i n g a da m .

2 /8 /2 0 , p l5
t.ciRi.A(‘its:
m ,r *Jiwk
fts trn l f p s e i t f ,
li t l K f r h
p r ic e * . m y

Ifffli*

l*'1.

II

T h e r e a r c 30 m ile* <>i f e n c e s b u ilt a n d in g o o d c o n d i t i o n .
✓
T h e r e is a n U - r o o m cu t s t o n e m o d e r n r e s i d e n c e t h a t c o s t o v e r
315.000 t o b u ild o n t h e . p r o p e r t y , w i t h g r a v i t y w a t e r s y s t e m , ho i
w a i c r h e a t e d am ! a c y t c l c i t e l i g h te d .

Ii*»»

»•»•••k

-

Great Falls Tribune
1 1 /1 2 /1 6 , p9
- S ri A * ' | ; K S
W illi

tl*’«--lftl

M at* -

?••.!*•••

«*r

r !'y

j»r«*j»**riy

Mu

T r i l » ' i n i ‘.

h
Ih 'l

A n e n c l o s e d r o c k f o u n d a t i o n s t o c k s h e d 3*0 b y 60 f e e t .
A r o c k b a r n . 100 h v 50 feet.

mil***

.» * r* v

par *

T aitf*

p aym ent.

'

Great Falls Tribune
2 /8 /2 0 , p i 5

w hich can he g r e a tly i n c r e a s e d by

|:.i*
i

A s t a b l e f o r .10 h e a d o f h o r . e s , w a g o n s h e d s , b l a c k s m i t h s h o p
g r a n e r y , s t o r e h o u s e s , b i m k h o i i s e s , tn cs s h o u s e s a n d e v e r y t h i n !
n e c e s sa ry for c o n d u c tin g a h ig h -c la ss u p - to -d a te ra n c h .
T h e r e i- a f i v e - i n i i l , b i t u m i n o u s c o a l v ein o n t h e p r o p e r t y ' f r o n
w h i c h fuel is m i n e d for o p e r a t i n g t h e r a n c h . T h i s cu ttfd Be d e
v e l o p e d i n t o a b i g |.rs>dticing m i n e at li t t le e x p e n s e .

Helena Independant 10/31/15, p7
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Clearly, the security of having an inexpensive

uncontested source of forage is

the primary

requirement to pay the small

element of that value. Despite the

fee that was associated with the permit, Barnes thought that stockmen with
permits were much better off than either those who had to complete on the
open range, or those who had to lease private ranges for fees averaging three
times as high (220).
Notwithstanding a fairly extensive record of the early disputes over both the
existence and levels of grazing fees that extends from the 1910s through to the
present, the

values of the permit itself was not extensively discussed. There is,

however, a

significant set of clues

that permits had some influence on ranch

market values well before the 1960s, when agricultural economists began to
study permit value. These clues can be found in the advertisements and
classified sections from old magazines and newspapers where ranches were
marketed. (See Figure 1.)
It is not uncommon to find ranches advertised as "adjoining forest reserve,"
or "controlling fine range" or having a number of "government" or "Taylor"
acres. The ranch advertisements sometimes simply added the word "deeded"
after the figure for acreage, to make it clear that the whole ranch was in fact
owned. Presumable this practice started because some sellers included various
leased and permitted acreage in their advertised figure for the ranch's total
acreage. Others were more honest, and clearly distinguished deeded acres from
leased acres in their ads, but obviously they still wanted to inform the buyer
that they were getting something of more value than the deeded land alone.
Since these ads usually contained little information about the ranches, and
proper ranch assessment considers many factors, it is difficult to determine
the influence that federally leased acreage had on the marketability of
ranches, and impossible to determine their influence on the selling price. It is
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also unclear how often land designated only as "leased" referred actually

to

land held through forest reserve or Forest Service permits, and later leases
under the Taylor Grazing Act. What is clear is that having extra leased acreage
must have given some advantage to the seller or these references would not
have been included in the ads, and that these permits did have some real estate
value well before the time that such value was investigated by economists.

PERM IT VALUE AND THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT
The next clearly documented indication of the existence and development of
permit value came in passage of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) of 1934. TheTGA
expanded federal management of grazing into over 100

million acres of

previously open range, creating an allotment system that had many
similarities to the Forest Service's. But

in contrast with the primary

usesof

timber and water in the National Forests, the TGA made grazing the primary
use of these public lands. The TGA called for managing these lands in the form
of grazing allotments. These allotments were connected to private holdings
through the establishment of ten year

renewable leases that were both

inheritable and transferred with the sale of the land (pending the approval of
the Grazing Service and its successor the BLM).
It is generally accepted that the TGA was passed to

mitigate overgrazing on

federal lands and to reduce conflicts among the users of those lands. It may be,
however, that its passage was made easier by the awareness of ranchers who
understood the value of Forest Service permits. They knew that a permit or
leasing system would give them not only more secure forage, but adso some
advantage and possibly extra value in the marketplace if they were ever to sell
their

ranch.
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One important, and often overlooked passage in the TGA also insures the
rancher that that extra value could be recognized by the banking system as
c o lla te ra l:
Except that no permittee complying with the rules and regulations laid
down by the Secretary of the Interior shall be denied the renewal of
such permit, if such denial will impair the value of the grazing unit ofthe permittee, when such unit is pledged as security for any bona fide
loan. (43 USCA §315b.)
Although it does seem rational to suppose that the ranchers' expectation of
gaining and retaining their allotment collateral and permit Value could have
been a reason in the passage of the extensively debated TGA, the extent of that
influence

remains

undocum ented

and

unanswered

here.

THE 1938 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Considering the Clear advantage and recognition of permits as collateral
that the TGA provides in section 43 USCA §315b, the signing of the 1938
Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Governor of the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) comes as no surprise. The
events that led to this memorandum were covered in the legislative report o f
the American Cattle Producer as early as March. 1935, in a discussion of a
meeting

regarding

grazing

permits:

The forests officials are conferring with officials for the Farm Credit
Administration, as well as Director of Grazing F. R. Carpenter, and it is
believed that a way will be found to work out the entire matter of
grazing regulations, so that there will be sufficient stability in the
operation to facilitate the making of federal bank loans on ranch
la n d s .1 1
Presumably that meeting led to the subsequent signing of the 1938
memorandum that focuses on the issue of loan security.

"Joint Conference with Forest Service Officials." American Cattle Producer.
16.(1935): 22.

The memorandum is clearer than the §315b of the TGA, and outlines a
procedure whereby a permittee is allowed to put the preference for their
grazing permits in escrow, using that escrow as loan collateral in all but name.
Under the agreement, in the event of foreclosure on a mortgage with such an
escrow, the Forest Service was required, "subject to its regulations and general
administrative [to] recognize the loan agency as the logical successor to a
preference." The loan agency could continue to graze the land until they sold
it, and pass on the preference to whomever bought the ranch. The agreement
also required that for permits in these escrow arrangements, the loan agency
be consulted in the event the Forest Service was going to reduce or discontinue
the permit, and that at least a year's warning be given before the reduction
was to take place.
The substance of the memorandum seems to be at least in part derived from
the passage of the amended Federal Farm Loan Act. That Act calls for
"reasonable assurance" of the continued use of the land when loads are made
to livestock owners who rely upon public grazing. The Forest Service and BLM
permit systems, along with the Memorandum of Agreement and Federal Farm
Loan Act, were undoubtedly seen by most as working towards the development,
prosperity

and security

of western ag ricu ltu ral'co m m u n ities.12 W ithout the

aid of the banks, many if not most of the ranches would not have been
established in the first place, and certainly could not survive droughts or
unforeseen downturns in stock prices. Over the years, however, this
stabilizing effect has often worked to cement existing grazing levels in place,

12 Currently, when a lease legally ends up in the hands of an institution
unqualified to renew it, the institution is given two years to transfer it (BLM
Manual 4110-2-2&3) and the two years can be extended if complications arise.
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even i n . areas where ecological considerations call for reductions. in grazing
le v e ls.
The agreement continues even today, under a somewhat altered and clarified
form (1986 Forest Service Handbook 18.32-2). This agreement, along with .the
general practice of banks making loans to ranchers based on both the deeded
and permit value of their ranches, has given rise to accusations by
environm entalists

that the banks

have an economic interest in maintaining

t

the permit

system and as a result use their political influence to

permits at their existing

maintain

l e v e l s . 1 3 ,

The existence of the memorandum and TGA's §315b clearly document that, by
the 1930s,

the value of permits was generally recognized to both

the stockmen

and the banks, but it raises more questions about the nature of permit value
than it answers. Was the value only in the form of stabilization of ranch units
and thus their mortgages, or did it take on real estate value as well, and if so
how much? How extensive was the practice of taking permits as collateral
before the legal provisions came into effect? After these provisions? While it
would take a major investigation beyond the scope of this work to discover the
historical or present extent of permit value's use as collateral, it is generally
recognized

as widespread ("Taxpayers

taken for ride by W estern

ranchers"),

even through the admission of FCA officers (Henson).
13 In the well known case of the disputed Diamond Bar allotment in New
Mexico's Gila National Forest, the environmental group Gila Watch found at
least six separate appeals from banks attempting to dissuade the Forest
Service from reducing the permit's AUM level. During part of the
controversy, the official permit level was held constant while the actual use
was tem porarily reduced.
During my interviews, I was discretely told by one of the land managers
(who preferred to remain anonymous) o f other allotments where the
permitted use level was held constant despite an actual reduction in the field.
These "temporary" reductions are apparently done to avoid conflicts with the
ranchers and the banks. The impression given was that this practice was not
uncommon, especially in cases of significant reductions.
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THE ERA OF GRAZING COUNCILS
If the stability of permit levels is a factor in permit value, so is the
likelihood of their renewal. In looking though the history of the management
of the permit system, it is rare that permits are not renewed to active ranchers
who continued to desire them .14 With this in mind, the most significant
change brought about by the TGA is clearly the development of the Grazing
Advisory Boards, which strongly influenced the lifestyle and values of
ranchers with TGA allotments.
In the first few years after the implementation of the TGA in 1934 most of
the grazing lands were divided into Grazing Districts. Each of the districts had
a Grazing Advisory Board that arbitrated disputes between ranchers and made
recommendations to the federal administrators as to grazing levels and permit
renewals. Each board consisted of nine positions. Four positions represented
cattlemen

and horsemen and four positions represented

sheepmen and

goatsmen elected by ranchers from within each grazing district. The state
appointed one position to represent wildlife interests.
Each district also had a district range manager who, at least on paper, was:
responsible for the protection and development of all the surface
resources in his district. Probably the major functions carried on in a
grazing district are grazing management, range conservation, range
improvements, forestry management, fire control, and wildlife
management. Once the boundaries of a district have been set, it is the
district range manager's duty to ascertain the carrying capacity of the
range. (Foss 99)
This is no small job, considering that many of the districts are larger than
C o n n ec tic u t.

14 The difficulty Hispanic ranchers in Northern New Mexico had in renewing
their permits is a noted exception. See William Eno DeBuys' Enchantment and
Exploitation. Albuquerque, NM: University of NM, 1985.
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With range managers spread so thin, it is easy to see how the day-to-day
decisions of such regulators could be ignored or influenced by groups of
ranchers, whose elected grazing advisory boards had officially recognized
power to make recommendations. The ranchers were well organized to
exercise political power. They had local, state, and national stockmen's
associations, and the support of many western senators, some of whom were
themselves ranchers. In Politics and. Grass, Foss even argues that this power,
combined with the Grazing Service's and later the BLM's lack of personnel in
these rural isolated areas, led to a system whereby the advisory boards made
over ninety percent of the management decisions in many districts.
State and national advisory boards were also instituted, and not only were
they effective in making most of the decisions, keeping administrators few
and powerless, and fees low, they increased in political savvy enough to
understand the importance of keeping the fee controversy and the
significance of permit value largely out of the public's attention. Congressman
Taylor called this influence, "Home rule on the range."
Two stories from the author William Kittredge, who grew up in southeastern
Oregon, reveal the irreverence that that power commanded:
We mostly regarded the BLM range management experts as impractical
college boys, and tried to ignore them when they asked us to change our
grazing practices. "You got to keep the cattle out of that Hill Camp
j
country for a couple of years," they would say, arid we would say, "Surer"
and smile, and then do as we damned pleased.
The

story

portrays

the

ranchers'

general

sentiment towards

government

officials as similar to a horse's feelings towards its pesky flies: they are in
constant need of being whisked away by the brush of their tail. At times, the
interactions

between

ranchers

and

officials

became

more

belligerent:

Around 1960—this may be an apocryphal story, point is we believed it
and loved it—a man from the BLM walked out into a hayfield to give some
old rancher an earful about running too many cattle on his allotment.
The rancher took after him with a gun. The chase led through the fields
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until the fellow from the BLM climbed up in a stack of loose meadow hay
and hid. The old rancher lit the haystack afire. "Cooked that
sonofabitch," the old rancher would say, at least according to the way I
heard the story. It was clearly us against them. They were trying to tell
us how to take care of our country, which we loved even as we caused
some damage now and then, and we hated them for their trouble.
The ranchers' attitude in these stories is not simply, "This is my allotment."
It is clear that often their attitude is more aptly phrased, "This is my land!" and
is rooted in many factors. Once again, it is important to remember that for the
old-time ranch families, the range was once grazed for free. Further,
throughout its development, the system whereby ranchers could lease
otherwise unused public land has been clearly and strongly coded into legal
system. Ranchers are the ones who have used and "improved" the land with
fences and watering systems. Within grazing districts, through the advisory
boards, they have had a strong say in local decision making. For a few
ranches, there is a sixty-to-ninety year history of leases held by a single
family. Finally, since most of the ecological and landscape transformations
resulting from grazing occurred years ago, most ranchers are not lying if
they say, "For as long as I can remember, the land always looked this way."
Although new environmental laws and the growth of the BLM, in both budget
and personnel, h a v e . slowly brought both management changes

and new

perspectives, it could be argued that the influence of the "Home rule on the
range"

philosophy

continues

even today.

MORE LEGAL CONFLICTS
Many of the recent arguments that explicitly propose grazing on public
land to be a legal right are derived from or refer back to the decision in R e d
Canyon Sheep Company v Ickes, 98 FR 2d 308, (1938). This complicated case
heard by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia put an injunction
on a land trade proposed by Mr. C. M. Harvey, who owned land completely
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enclosed by National Forest, and wanted to trade his land for some land
controlled by the Department of Interior. The Interior's land, however, had
already been put into a grazing district as authorized by Section 7 of the TGA,
and had, "by an Executive Order of November 26, 1934, No 6910, [been]
withdrawn from settlement, location, sale or entry" (98 FR 2d 311), pending
further

classificatio n .

Further, a temporary license to graze had already been given to the Red
Canyon Sheep Co., which argued that it would suffer a substantial loss if the
trade proceeded, as they fully expected the license to eventually become a
permit. The court agreed and stopped the transfer, apparently admitting that
the Red Canyon Sheep Co. had a right to graze.
the court also asserted that

the Secretary of the

What is often forgotten is that
Interior still had the power

to

reclassify that land and take it out of the grazing district at any time so that he
could then proceed with the transfer if he so chose.
The court's allowance that the Secretary has such power implied that the
company had no property right in regards to the grazing federal land, and is
thusconsistent with the decisions in the

Grimaud, Light, and Omaechevarria

cases. Still, in a few places in this decision, the courts used other language that
can be read to substantiate "grazing rights." First, in their examination of the
phrase from Part I, §3 of the TGA, "stock owners as under his rules and
regulations are entitled

to participate in the use of the range," the decision

states:
But we .do conclude that if the Secretary determines to set up a grazing
district including lands upon which grazing has been going on, then
those who have been grazing their livestock upon these lands and who
bring themselves within a preferred class set up by the statute and
regulations, are entitled as of right to permits as against others who do
not possess the same facilities fdr economic and beneficial use of the
range. (98 FR 2d 314)
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The courts use of the words "entitled" and "right" resound for those who would
like public land grazing to be an absolute property right, even if the decision
only actually clarifies the decision-making process that chooses which
ranchers are to get permits.
Further, although this decision agrees with other courts that grazing is not
a vested right, it also states that:
Yet, whether they be called rights, privileges, or bare licenses, or by
whatever name, while they exist they are something of real value to the
possessors and something which have their source in an enactment of
the Congress. (98 FR 2d 315)
In such a statement, grazing rights activists see the courts affirming permit
value. On the other hand, most environmentalists are either unaware of such
statements, or chose to downplay or ignore them. Although they are correct in
continually calling allotments public land, simply calling them such does not
take away the privileges to their use that Congress gave to ranchers. The
question then becomes, "To what extent is that privilege itself something
s u b s ta n tia l? "
Two other controversial cases have important relevance to the question of
permit value. Both United States v. Jaramillo, and later United States v. Fuller,
deal with circumstances where the government took away private lands
through eminent domain, but left the grazing permits intact. In both cases the
question was not whether the landowner should be awarded money for the
allotment (which the courts have refused to do even if permits are canceled),
but whether a jury should take into consideration the potentially increased
value that ^private land has due to the proximity of the allotment lands and
their economic importance to the landowner.
The judge in the Jaramillo case allowed the jury to consider the influence of
the allotment on the real estate value, but in a five to four decision on the
Fuller case the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district and appeals
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courts, which had also allowed the jury to consider the importance of the
permit, arguing that the government was not required to pay compensation
for a value that the government had created (i.e. permit value). In this case
the government ended up paying $136,500, when Fuller's expert witnesses had
valued the land at upwards of a million dollars, and the original jury was going
to compromise, awarding Fuller $350,000.
The other major legal quandary that has solidified the value of grazing
permits in the minds of many involves the practices of the IRS. Although I
have

not been able to find a clear starting point for this practice, for many

years

the IRS has figured inheritance tax

on the total value of a ranching

estate, including the assessed value attributed to its grazing allotments. Thus,
although originally a permit may have been awarded to some lucky rancher,
the rancher's heirs are required to pay for 50% of the allotment's value. Even
though this law only applies to the value of an estate that exceeds a certain
limit,

all but the smallest ranches have at least part of their value taxed. The

sentiment among many ranchers is that if

the IRS recognizes the value of

permits, than the Forest Service and BLM should also.

GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
The seeds of many of the present disputes over public land grazing were
planted in the 1960s, with the passage of the Wilderness Act (1964), the

'

Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA-1964), the National Historic
Preservation Act (1966) and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968). Each, to
varying degrees, brought changes in grazing policy. Then, a whole new set of
laws passed during the environmental movement of the seventies opened the
door to many more changes, with the passage of the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA-1970), the Endangered Species Act (ESA-1973), the Clean

31
Water Act (CWA-1972), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA-1976), the
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA-1976, also known as the
BLM Organic Act) and the Public Rangeland Improvement Act (PRIA-1978).
The most significant event in this era was undoubtedly the 1974 landmark
decision in the Natural Resource Defense Council's suit (NRDC v. Morton),
which used NEPA to require that the BLM do Environmental Impact Statements
on its rangelands

before reissuing leases. The suit forced the BLM

to conduct

144 site specific Environmental Assessments (EAs) and Environmental Impact
: Statements (EISs) to analyze the effects of grazing, thus allowing

public

comments to be made for each individual allotment. Many of these assessments
initially called for significant reductions in grazing, but these reductions
were lessened through appeals and political pressure. Even still, since that
decision, NEPA has probably been the strongest and most widely used tool for
environm entalists
obviously

to

im pacted

force changes

in

allotm ent management,

particularly

in

areas.

■NEPA, along with the strong language in MUSYA, FLPMA, and the PRIA, gave
environmentalists the ability to force the recognition of recreation, scenic,
and habitat values, to make changes in agency monitoring and management
techniques, and even to alter individual

allotment plans. Still,

environm entalists have only made significant changes in areas

where they

could keep their attention and efforts focused. Charles Wilkinson offers an
explanation as to why overall environmentalists efforts have only been
m arginally

successful:

The public interest groups...can gear up reasonably well for a
sweeping legislative initiative such as the enactment of FLPMA, but
they almost entirely lack the ability to influence the thousands of
significant policy decisions made every year in the BLM and Forest

Service field offices.... These include what are in a sense the most
important decisions of all: to allow by default this grazing. allotment,
that grazing allotment...to go ahead for yet another year under what
amounts to no management. For the cattle industry, administrative
lobbying at that level is literally part of the cost of doing business. ( I l l )
Some local environmental groups have taken his words to heart. The Oregon
’
f
Natural Resources Council recently developed a model citizen monitoring
.-

system in which volunteers are trained to monitor and comment on grazing .
allotments, and are asked to visit allotments three times a year. Other groups
are following suit, and various new guides to monitoring grazing allotments,
including the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance's publication, How Not to be
C ow ed, are also being developed. These give citizens quick access to much of
the information and the tools they need to comment on the allotments where
they hike, hunt, or fish.
Each of these new laws and efforts has brought gradual change to public
land grazing practices. The Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
both directly threaten permit value, but only for a small portion of the
allotment system. Although the implementation of these laws usually leave
allotments within designated, areas intact for the current, users, designation
usually includes a provision that ends the leasing of allotments when the land
is sold. This eliminates the permit value of these allotments. Under MUSYA and
FLPMA, areas that were once consider largely or primarily devoted to grazing
use are now forced to compete with other uses. Sometimes these other uses
conflict with grazing, leading to a decline in AUM levels. With the ESA and
National Historic Preservation Act, ranchers now fear that evidence of
artifacts or endangered species on their allotments will limit or end grazing.
Overall these new laws, whose affects generally get incorporated into the
NEPA process, have still brought only gradual changes in total AUM levels
-

0

allowed by the BLM and Forest Service. Nevertheless, a number of allotments
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have been hit hard by NEPA assessments or occasional lawsuits that call for
significant reductions in AUM levels or an end to grazing altogether.
These reductions, whether proposed or implemented, spark ire and
resistance from the public lands ranchers, who clearly fear further
reductions in their overall profits and to permit value. Even the ranchers who
are not facing immediate reductions fear that they may have to face
threatened or actual reductions in the future. The question remains, however,
as to how much overall influence these new environmental laws have on
permit value. While reducing an allotment's AUM level will clearly reduce its
permit value, managers often make these reductions temporary, or reduce the
'"actual use" of an allotment while, keeping the official "permitted use" on the
books

stable.15 This allows them to keep their real estate value and value as

collateral. Many ranchers and agricultural economists argue that the new
environmental laws reduce the value of each AUM value, but do market trends
really reflect this conception? It may be that the perceived threat of AUM
reductions and the associated increased risk of investing in permit value have
developed enough of a psychological influence that they have achieved the
status of actual market forces.

THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION
For many ranchers, along with groups of loggers, millworkers, miners, and
others whose jobs were tied to the public land, and to a more vocal' and visible
group of conservative thinkers and politicians, this new era of environmental
laws caused a wave of fear, distaste, and anger, which led in part to their

15 I discovered this through the interview process, and confirmed it with
ranchers and land managers, who preferred to remain anonymous on this
p o in t.
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organizing around a powerful new formulation of their historically rooted
sentiments. The call of the Sagebrush Rebellion, with its aim of bringing the
federal domain into state control, and of its offshoot, which called for
privatization of federal land, caused a response in them that could not have
been more clear. For many it was the desire to solidify what they felt they
already had, but were at risk of losing: the control of the land. For the
ranchers, if the rangelands were held by the state or privately, they would
have more influence over decisions affecting them, and little or no risk of
losing the economic value of the allotment leases they had long held and
continue to feel invested in, with both their money and labor.
The Sagebrush Rebellion has its roots in the dissension of the western
.stockmen that started early

in the century. Rowley recounts

how the stockmen

at the Public Lands Convention held in Denver in 1907, upset over grazing
regulations and fees, "talked in

terms of western secession"

(65). Similar

disputes, 'term ed the "blowup in Region 2" erupted in the late 1940s in Colorado.
The ensuing political battle
public

lands

sentim ent

has

continued,

that aimed to further ranchers' rights
often

unifying

the ranchers'

to graze on

anti-agency

(207-217).

The modern Sagebrush Rebellion began in 1979 when the Nevada legislature
passed a bill-claim ing ownership of all 48 million acres of BLM land in the
state. Within the next two years, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming
passed similar legislation, while Hawaii and South Dakota passed resolutions
supporting the cause. Meanwhile the rebels' proposals were argued but
defeated in seven other states (Cawley, 2). Secretary of Interior James Watt
even took steps, ultimately unsuccessful, to sell off large portions of public
lan d .
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The courts overruled these measures and few actual policy changes resulted
from the movement. As Cawley suggests:
the Sagebrush Rebellion represented a protest against the
environm ental movement. The measure of environm ental influence, in
turn, was the proliferation of regulations.... The question confronting
the Sagebrush Rebels, therefore, was how to curtail the environmental
community's influence and thereby stem the tide of regulations. (161)
Viewed in that light, the rebels won most of the battles over grazing in the
1980s, by preventing the passing of many new environmental laws, and
generally maintaining low fee and stable AUM levels.
With Reagan's election and the prospect of looser regulations and
enforcement, much of the momentum of the movement stalled. The ranchers
had their man in the White House and did not need to rebel. But the war was
not over. It took Bush's declaration of his environmentalism to rekindle the
movement and mend some of the splits between different rebel factions:
Representatives from many of the interests that had populated the
Sagebrush Rebellion convened in Reno, Nevada, in August 1988 to
attend a Multiple Use Strategy Conference. This conference marked the
beginning of the Wise Use Movement. (Cawley 164)
As it turned out, they had little to worry about, since in practical terms Bush's
administration of the public domain was much like Reagan's. Nevertheless, the
movement continued. For many ranchers the philosophic

and economic

principles voiced by the Wise Use movement spoke of the concerns which had
underlain

their long-standing

controversy

over grazing

fees.

The movement

collected the sentiments and ideas they lived by but had never completely or
coherently

form ulated.

THE BABBITT REFORMS AND 1990s ENVIRONMENTALISM
The amazing grassroots and often bipartisan strength of the Wise Use
movement arose yet again in 1993, when Clinton, through his Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt, proposed new fee increases for federal allotments. The
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controversy again exploded, and this time not just on the range or in the back
rooms of Congress, but with national attention:
W estern ranchers came streaming into W ashington last week, string
ties hoisted, hats as wide as the plains, boots gleaming. But they were
jumpy and angry. And in the shadowy halls of the Capitol and the
Interior and Agriculture Departments, they listened and argued about
Bill Clinton's proposal to raise prices on government land and '
resources. (Sidey 39)
)

After this visit, and intense pressure from western senators, Clinton
backpedaled and proposed compromise, but did not completely give up on the
issue.
Babbitt held extensive meetings throughout the West over the next two years
and found a number of common complaints and difficulties. He then came up
with a new set of reforms that included among others, a more modest fee
increase, some incentive measures for lessees who managed their lands well,
establishm ent of Grazing Advisory Councils, allowing ranchers more leeway
■

'J

in resting their allotments, and allowing nonranchers to lease allotments.
While some of these proposals have been implemented, including the Grazing
Advisory Councils, others, including the right-to-rest provision

and allowing

nonranching leaseholders, are still working their way though the court
s

y

s t e

m

.

Qn one hand the laws regarding allotment leases req u ire that

allotments be grazed, but they also allow the lessee to temporarily halt grazing
to improve allotment conditions. At issue is the question of how much
discretion the BLM has in defining "temporary."
These last two issues have also hit the state courts in Oregon, Idaho, New
Mexico and Arizona, after environmental groups started to outbid ranchers for
16 The Federal District Court of Wyoming overruled many of
reforms, including the provision allowing extended resting
termed "conservation use." For the decision, which is being
Public Lands Council v. - United States Department o f Interior,
(1996).

Babbitt’s proposed
of allotments
appealed, see
929 F. Supp 1436
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the leases of state-controlled school grant lands, hoping to give these
allotments an extended or permanent rest. Nevertheless, most of these leases
were still awarded to the lower-bidding ranchers who had held them
previously. Some of cases are headed to their respective state supreme courts,
and may finally end up in the US Supreme Court.
Other recent developments in the 1990s have been forcing significant
changes in grazing levels and practices which indirectly affect the question
of permit value. In the Columbia River Basin, the declaration of various
salmon and steelhead runs as threatened or endangered, followed by the
publication of P a c fish , the draft EIS which discusses the implications of these
listings, has already begun to force land managers to fence the riparian areas
of affected streams to protect them from cattle grazing, for fear of lawsuits.
.W ith the listing of the bull trout and expected listing of the westslope cutthroat
trout, In fish and the Interior Columbia Basin EIS could force similar measures
throughout much of the Inland West. In the Southwest, after the listing of
willow flycatcher and other species, other suits have successfully asked for
grazing reductions in their habitat and more are expected to follow.
Finally, Judge Haggerty's 1996 decision in the Clean Water Act case, O reg on
Natural Desert Association et al. v. Jack Ward Thomas, may become the latest
bane to the public lands ranchers. The decision establishes, "that applicants
for federal grazing permits receive, as a necessary precondition to the
issuance of that permit, certification from the state in which the grazing is to
occur that the grazing will not adversely impact state water quality standards"
(4). This is extraordinary because the Clean Water Act has not been much of a
fa c to r. in grazing disputes, even though as a nonpoint sediment pollution
source, sedimentation from grazing affects thousands of miles of rivers and
streams, as well as extensive wetlands throughout the West. According to Bill
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Marlett at Oregon Natural Desert Association, the "EPA has already supported
401 applicability as a policy matter, and has been joined by the Association of
State Attorneys General on the legal issues." If this certification process moves
forward, it is likely to become a tool used by environmentalists to reduce AUMs,
thus reducing the total permit value of allotments.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS’ SUCCESS
With the introduction of the bill, S. 852, To Provide fo r Uniform Management
o f Livestock Grazing on Federal Land, and Other Purposes, in 1995 by Senator
Domenici of New Mexico, the ranching community began to respond to the
environmentalists' success in the courts with a series of legislative responses.
The goals still clearly include maintaining low fee levels, but due to low prices
of beef in the 1990s, which in part determine those levels, environmentalists
have not been successful in raising fees. The goals of the "Domenici Bill" and
the other legislative proposals that followed are more focused on stopping the
erosion of the total AUM levels, stopping the elimination of grazing from
individual allotments, blocking the general public's ability to influence
allotment management decisions, elim inating the recent reforms in BLM
grazing management, and blocking the use of the ESA to modify grazing
management. Overall, these bills can be seen as an attempt to give ranchers
with public land, leases greater control over those lands than they have had
since the passing of the Taylor Gazing Act in 1934.
The Domenici Bill provided for increasing the . duration of most leases from
ten to fifteen years, and provided further isolation to the ranchers by limiting
possible public comment on the BLM and Forest Service allotment management
plans (AMPs) to that, of "affected interests." The bill then redefined an
"affected interest," limiting it to a person or group who "has provided
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substantial evidence that the management of the public lands will affect that
individual or organization" (§103). This definition, if passed into law, would
have made it increasingly difficult for the general public to influence or
appeal the AMPs that are written into the leases. (These plans sometimes ask
for a decrease in AUMs to benefit the riparian areas, scenic values, and
w ildlife

habitat

within

allotm ents.)

Domenici's bill drew enough attention that it provoked a coordinated and
successful effort by environmental groups to prevented its passage. They were
not fooled by the bill's attempt to obscure some of its major provisions, which
repealed or amended sections of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act, by
referring to them only by number, when in fact these sections contained the
strongest environm ental protection

language

in that Act.

But not everything was hidden. Besides the obvious increase of leases from
ten to fifteen

years, there were a few glaring sections that clearly showed that

this

bill could generally

threaten

long-term

rangeland productivity.

Consider

the

new definition for livestock carrying capacity that opens the door to calls

for

reassessing current allotment limits:

"The term 'livestock carrying

capacity' 'm eans the maximum sustainable stocking rate that is • possible
without inducing permanent damage to vegetation or related resources"
(§104.23). It does not take much foresight to realize that any tests attempting to
ascertain that

carrying capacity would

induce the permanent damage that

they were, in

theory, aiming to prevent. Additionally, Jhe bill attempted to

make the issuing of permits or leases a federal action that would be outside the
consideration of NEPA (§121). On final analysis, the bill looks like an attempt to
farther codify the, "This is my allotment!" attitude.
Although Domenici's bill failed, a little known rider was quietly slipped into
the 1995 Rescissions Bill (PL 104-19 §504) along with the "Salvage Rider." It
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called for the Forestv Service to implement a schedule to ensure, "that not more
than 20 percent of the allotments shall undergo NEPA analysis" each year. This
might not seem very significant, but there was and continues to be a backlog
of allotments due for renewal. Moreover, the bill also forces the Forest Service
to renew the allotments which have their analyses delayed with their current
terms and conditions, until the time they can be fully assessed. This allows
overgrazed allotments, many of which still lack AMPs and are long overdue for
assessment, to avoid analysis for up to ten more years— and maintain their
existing permit value. Aside fro m . this drawback, theoretically a clear schedule
of allotment assessments could bring some long-term benefits, because it
might allow the Forest Service to designate sufficient personnel to work on
them, and thus eventually allow for better quality AMPs, EAs and EISs.
In 1997, Representative Bob Smith introduced a slightly toned down version
'Of Domenici's bill, "The Forage Improvement Act of 1997." It has got more
support than the previous version, passing in the House on October 30, 1997 by
a 242-182 vo te.. Nevertheless, so far it failed to become law even after it was
modified to offer at 30% increase in grazing fees (from $1.35 to $1.85 per AUM).
This failure is undoubtedly in part due to the heightened awareness of major
environmental groups to these issues that was brought by

Domenici's bill.

Still, Domenici has not completely failed to gather support this session in his
efforts to maintain the existing AUMs and permit value of federal allotments.
In the Interior Appropriations bill signed in November 1997, a rider was
slipped in that effectively reversed a court decision that may have stopped
grazing on over four hundred allotments due to concerns over endangered
sp ecies.
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THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
Clearly the struggle between ranchers and environmentalists runs deeper
than a controversy over low grazing fees. This struggle encompasses the
shape and continuance of the public land grazing system. Central to these
issues is maintaining the value of permits and the economics and value of
public lands ranching. While not all environmentalists called for, "Cattle free
by '93,” most are concerned about the health of riparian areas, endemic
ecosystems, and endangered species, and support significant reductions in
AUM levels.
The counter-argument heard from ranchers is that many ranching
operations would fold with higher fees or lower AUMs, and that they are
defending their way of life. This argument does have some merit for
operations running on marginal profits, with a high dependency on federal
lands, or with high debts. In these cases, higher fees or lower AUMs
significantly cut into profits and lower permit values. Lower permit values
also reduce a ranch's collateral value, thus making it more difficult to
refinance if hard times hit. With foreign or corporate owned ranches,
however, or with larger family owned but more profitable and less federally
dependent operations, the motivation of "protecting a way of life" must be
questioned. Many operations would not go under even if they were stripped of
federal lands or if fees were tripled. For them the motivations surely include
both maintaining their permits' real estate value and the year-to-year profits
that come with allotments.
From the historical record, it is impossible to determine just what
motivations influenced specific political events in the history of public land
grazing. Fee levels, AUM levels, permit values and profit are. simply too
interwoven to separate when considering the motivations of policy decisions
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and legislative proposals, since most proposals or decisions have the potential
to affect all of them. The real motivations for these efforts can really only be
explained by the ranchers themselves, and will be further explored in Chapter
Four, which discusses the results of interviewing ranchers and individuals
whose work brings them in close contact with ranchers.

CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMICS OF PERMIT VALUE

This chapter returns to the question, "Why does permit value exist, and how
can it be assessed?" The chapter starts by discussing different methods for
ranch appraisal, then looks at the two theories as to why permit value exists.
These theories, in turn lead into a discussion of the total true cost of public

and

private leases. Next, various methods used to assess permit value will be
discussed, followed by

a look at the results from key academic studies of permit

value, and the factors

that could explain the variability of their results.

TYPES OF RANCH APPRAISAL
As discussed previously, in simplest terms, permit value is the additional real
estate value of a ranch gained from having the privilege and use of a public
land grazing allotment

from either the Forest Service or BLM .17 Still, since

both the agencies and

the judicial system have made it clear that these permits

are not owned, then where does that value come from?
Any understanding of permit values requires at least a cursory
understanding of ranch appraisal. Traditionally one of the simplest

and easiest

(although not necessarily more accurate) ways to appraise a ranch is to base
the value on the ranch's carrying capacity (American Institute of Real Estate
17 State and private leases can also have permit value, but they are not the
focus of this study.
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Appraisers; Gee et al.; Oppenheimer), i.e., the sheer numbers of livestock that
the forage

and feed available to the operation can support. The

other

traditional assessment method is based on estimating the expected income of
the ranch,then using capitalization techniques to project
operation's

expected worth and

the

ranch

investm ent potential.

Both carrying capacity and expected income are still often used for a quick
estimate of a ranch values, but
consider

appraisers and economists now routinely

and assign values to more than a dozen

factors including the value

and upkeep of the buildings, the distance to the nearest town and railroad,
scenic value,

acreage in crops, water rights, the percentage of irrigated land,

operational costs, and the percentage of deeded forage compared to private
leased forage, state leased forage, Forest Service leased forage and BLM leased
forage. Operational costs are, in turn, broken down into numerous associated
fa c to rs .
This type of breakdown, when applied to a large set of unforced ranch
s a le s ,1& allows economists to do a type of regression analysis known as hedonic
modeling. In a hedonic model, each factor that is expected to influence the
price significantly is measured and assigned a unit value, then put into an
equation

with a variable coefficient. With a large enough

set of data, these

variables

can be solved. The solution gives the average

influence that each

unit of a given factor has on the sale price. For example, each acre of irrigated
rangeland may end up valued at $100 more than non-irrigated land, or each
mile from a railroad station might reduce the value of the whole ranch by $50,
i.e. reducing the value of a ranch 40 miles from a station by $2000.

*8 An unforced sale is a sale between a willing seller and willing buyer, with
no influence from excessive debt, inability to continue ranching operations
or other factors than could unusually inflate or reduce the price.
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TWO THEORIES ON THE SOURCE OF PERMIT VALUE
Up until the 1960s, there was little documentation of permit value. . Starting
in the 1960s, a number Of agricultural economists began to study it, primarily
because of its relationship to grazing fee levels. Until recently, these studies

/

generally agreed that the existence of permit value was a result of the
economic benefits from

public land leases grazing fees

being set lower than

those paid in a competitive market setting. Lower fees result initially in a
yearly operational savings to the rancher. This savings, in turn, becomes an
expected part of the yearly operation of the ranch. Then, since allotment
permits and leases traditionally
buyers and

get transferred with the

sale of the ranch,

sellers began to see the expected savings associated with them as

an investment; however, the security of that investment required that
allotment grazing fees remain lower than fees for private leases. To estim ate,
the worth of that investment, economists could then use traditional' appraisal
and capitalization methods similar to those used on a variety o f investments.
Another theory, promoted by Iqbal and rooted in traditional ranch appraisal
techniques, finds that there is often no significant cost savings from public
allotments compared to private leases or private land. Instead, permit value is
found to be the result of the benefits associated with the economy of scale that
comes with holding allotments (or contracts for private leases). Simply put,
larger ranches cost less

to run per cow, because many

overhead costs either

remain fixed or increase only marginally in a larger operation. These costs
include such factors as

maintaining a homestead and office, accounting costs,

purchasing and maintaining tools, and often fencing, herding

and riding

costs.
Iqbal's

theory is also closely related to those of scholars who claim that

permit value was simply

the result of the initial assignment of allotments.

The

ranchers who were awarded the first allotments were given what can be seen
as a gift from the government. Between that original assignment and the late
1960s, over 85% of allotments had been sold to new owners (Nielson and
Workman). The percentage of these leases that have changed hands by that
late 1990s is even higher. Each new lease holder paid the original lease holder
for the value associated with that "gift" when they >purchased their ranch and
lease(s) at full market value. That, value, according to Iqbal, is the advantage
related to the economy of scale that is retained in these larger operations
through

federal

grazing

allotm ents.

THE TRUE COST OF GRAZING LEASES
Underling Iqbal's theory is the assumption that the total costs of grazing on
public lands are generally equivalent to the total cost of grazing on private
lands. This assumption is based on studies that found that the non-fee costs
were higher on public land due to increased costs from herding and moving
livestock,

transportation,

lost animals, improvements

and

maintenance.

These

increased costs make the total cost of public land allotments equal to those of
private

leases.

The question of the "true costs" of grazing on public lands remains a highly
debated issue and has been the object numerous articles and studies. Its
importance comes largely from the legal mandate in the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-579) that requires, "The United States
receive fair market value of the use of the public lands and their resources..."
(§ 102(a)). It is almost universally acknowledged that the fees charged for the
use of Forest Service and BLM allotments are less that those charged for
private and (most) state allotments.
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It is, however, also generally agreed that the costs to the rancher of
running cattle on federal lands are somewhat more than those of private lands
because of the extra services provided in those leases, and the extra costs
associated with federal allotments. These services vary with different
contracts, but often include fence maintenance, salt and watering, and may
include transportation and herding. The extra expenses o f federal land may
include increased
improvements,

animal loss,

paperwork,

and

riding and herding,
dealing

with

maintaining

federal bureaucrats.

There is extensive disagreement, however, over the difference between the
(average) total costs of grazing on federally leased compared to the (average)
©

total costs of grazing on private leases. Some studies (Bartlett et al.; Obermiller;
Rostvold and Dudley; Torell, Van Tassell et al.) conclude that after including
the federal fee, the total costs of federal and private leases are comparable, and
that some ranchers are paying even higher costs for federal leases. The data
for these studies came through extensive surveying of ranchers, who were
asked detailed questions about their public and private land operational costs.
Not surprisingly, these studies and their methodologies are disputed by
environmentalists and others, partly because the figures used for estimating
average costs are often based on surveys of the ranchers themselves, and not
on outside accounting methods. Jacobs also points to evidence gathered in the
Committee on Government Operations that show extensive (illegal) subleasing
of federal leases at rates approaching private lease rates, and concludes that if
there is someone willing to pay a higher price, that allotments' forage must
have that higher value.
Other studies (Gee et al.; Obermiller and Lambert; Rimbey; USDI and USDA
1977) find that the total costs of federal leases are below those of private leases.
Interestingly, well before the requirement that fees be based on fair market

48
value, Gardner reports that, "The ranchers in the survey who had Bureau of
Land M anagement permits

reported no cost differences between renting

“\

•

private pastures and BLM district grazing, except for fencing expense" (55). He
also finds that not including fees, ranchers with Forest Service permits have
higher costs, but these costs are still well below the total cost of private leases.
One element offered as significant, but often overlooked as part of this
debate, is the question of whether the cost of the interest from the investment
in the permit value of mortgaged ranches should be included as part of the
total cost of federal leases. The agencies and courts have ruled that in
determining grazing fees, it should not be considered (because they do not
recognize the legal existence of permit value). Many economists argue that the
cost of interest from loans needs to be included, because failure to do so creates
the apparent discrepancy found in some studies between the total costs of
public and private leases.
After examining the arguments over the "true cost of leases," it appears that
the expectation of savings on forage costs, and the additional savings from the
economies

of scale that come along with the ranches' increased size

are both

important factors that can lead to the development of permit value for
allotments

tied to ranch operations. Any profitable ranch may benefit from

increased carrying capacity, below market forage costs or savings from the economy of scale. The increased carrying capacity that comes with a permit
gives it larger income and profit potential. Over and above increased carrying
capacity, any other savings from lower fees or economy o f scale should be
seen as extra benefits which would

increase permit value.

Obviously, ranch operations and their associated allotments are extremely
varied, so

different ranches benefit from these factors to different

degrees.

Generally,, in smaller operations it is likely that expected savings would be the

49

least significant. In mid-sized operations it is likely that expected savings on
forage costs would be significant, and there would be some savings due to
economy of scale. In larger operations, where the costs of fencing, herding
and riding are more likely to decrease with size and the expected savings on
monthly forage costs increase, the savings from the economics o f scale
become

more

significant.

ESTIMATIONS OF PERMIT VALUE
There have been over twenty different studies attempting to determine the
permit value of public land allotments. As can be seen from Tables 1-3, the
studies vary in method, date, and location, thus it is difficult to directly
compare them. No method claims to be completely accurate, and most of the
studies focus on finding an average permit value for a specific state over a
specific

time.

Each method has some tendency to focus on certain factors that weigh the
results. The capitalization method is dependent on the expectation of savings
from public land forage, and often ignores documentation on sale values.
Surveys of ranchers, appraisers and Realtors are dependent on perceived
values and are thus influenced by national politics, local policy enforcement
by BLM and Forest Service officials, and the degree of interest and influence
of environmentalists in a particular area. Results based on regression analyses
are dependent on the hedonic model chosen, and various models can give
different results to the same sets of data. Models are chosen and modified in
attempts to produce results that realistically reflect the importance of each
chosen factor in the real estate market, but it is possible that some of these
modifications

are influenced by expected results rather than actual market-

based influences

and variations.

Table
Study
Notes
Gardner
Gee
Rimbey
Workman
Gardner
Roberts
>
Fowler & Gray
Ferguson
Fowler & Gray
USDA&USDI
$ 3 0 -3 4 8
Martin & Jeffries
Winter & Whittaker
Workman & King
Rowen & Workman
Igbal
Spahr & Sunderman
Torell & Fowler
Torell & Doll
Rowen & Workman
Collins
Torell & Doll
Peak year
Sunderman & Spahr
Kincaid
Spahr & Sunderman
Torell et al.
Torell et al.
Torell et al.
Torell & Kincaid
Torell & Kincaid
Torell & Kincaid

Method
Capitalization
Capitalization
Capitalization
Capitalization
Survey
Survey
Survey
Survey
Survey
Appraisal
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Various
Various
Various

: Permit Va ue bv Method
Years
1 950-1958
1980
1984
1992
1958
Pre-1963
1965
1979
1979
1 983
Pre-1966
1 970-1978
1 975-1980
197 5 -1 98 7
1 978-1993
1 97 9 -1 98 3
1 979-1985
1 979-1988
1 980-1988
1980-1981
1982
1 986-1989
1 987-1994
198 9 -1 99 3
1992
1992
1992
1982
1988
1994

Location
$/BLMAUM
$/FSAUM
NW Colorado
44
23
Colorado
7 1-76
Idaho
29
29
Oregon
36
11
NW Colorado
16
Utah
10
20
New Mexico
46
49
5 6-74
New Mexico
7 9-97
71
New Mexico
' 82
11 States Ave
68
68
Arizona
13
23
E. Oregon
As deeded
As deeded
Utah
30
30
Utah
22
22
E. OR & Nev
37
37
Wyoming
6 4 -2 2 0
142-275
New Mexico
93
93
New Mexico
68
68
Utah
42
42
Wyoming
55
New Mexico
100
150
Wyoming^
0 or 12
4 6 -6 6
New Mexico
8 0-90
60-10 5
Wyoming
0-59
188
Wyoming
36
47
Idaho .
37
42
89
New Mexico
72
New Mexico
125
1 45
75
New Mexico
70
New Mexico
.
87
60

Table 2: Permit Value by Date
Notes
Study
Gardner
Gardner
Roberts
Martin & Jeffries
Fowler & Gray
Winter & Whittaker
Workman & King
Rowen & Workman
Iqbal
Ferguson
Fowler & Gray
Spahr & Sunderman
Torell & Fowler
Torell & Doll
Rowen & Workman
Gee
Collins
Torell & Doll
Peak year
Torell & Kincaid
US DA & USDI
$ 3 0 -3 4 8
Rimbey
Sunderman & Spahr
Kincaid
Torell & Kincaid
Spahr & Sunderman
Workman
Torell et al.
Torell et al.
Torell et al.
Torell & Kincaid

Method
Capitalization
Survey
Survey
Regression.
Survey
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Survey
Survey
Regression
Regression
Regression
Regression
Capitalization
Regression
Regression
Various
Appraisal
Capitalization
Regression
Regression
Various
Regression
Capitalization
Regression
Regression
Regression
Various

Years
1 950-1958
1958
Pre-1963
Pre-1966
1965
197 0 -1 97 8
1 975-1980
197 5 -1 98 7
197 8 -1 99 3
1979
1979
197 9 -1 98 3
1 979-1985
1979-1988
198 0 -1 98 8
1 980
1980-1981
1982
1982
1983
1984
1 986-1989
1987-1994
1988
1989-1993
1992
1992
1992
1992
1994

Location
$/BLMAUM
$/FSAUM
NW Colorado
44
23
NW Colorado
11
16
Utah
10
20
Arizona
13
23
New Mexico
46
49
E. Oregon
As deeded
As deeded
Utah
30
30
Utah
22
22
E. OR & Nev
37
37
New Mexico
79-97
56-74
New Mexico
82
71
Wyoming
6 4-22 0
142-275
New Mexico
93
93
New Mexico
68
68
Utah
42
42
Colorado
71-76
Wyoming
55
New Mexico
100
150
New Mexico
125
145
11 States Ave
68
68
Idaho
29
29
Wyoming
0 or 12
4 6-66
New Mexico
8 0-90
6 0-10 5
New Mexico
70
75
Wyoming
188
0-59
Oregon
36
Wyoming
47
36
Idaho
42
37
New Mexico
72
89
New Mexico
87
60

Table 3: Perm it Value by State
Study
Notes
Gardner
Gardner
Gee
Roberts
Workman & King
Rowen & Workman
Rowen & Workman
Martin & Jeffries
Fowler & Gray
Ferguson
Fowler & Gray
Torell & Fowler
Torell & Doll
Torell & Doll
Peak year
Torell & Kincaid
Kincaid
Torell & Kincaid
Torell et al.
Torell & Kincaid
Winter & Whittaker
Iqbal
Workman
Spahr & Sunderman
Collins
Sunderman & Spahr
Spahr & Sunderman
Torell et al.
Rimbey
Torell et al.
USDA & USDI
$30 -3 4 8

Method
Years
Capitalization
1 950-1958
Surv. Ranchers
1958
Capitalization
1980
Survey
Pre-1963
Regression
1 975-1980
Regression
1 975-1987
Regression
1 980-1988
Regression
Pre-1966
Survey
.1965
Survey
1979
Survey
1979
Regression
1 979-1985
Regression
1979-1988
Regression
1982
Various
1982
Regression
198 7 -1 99 4
Various
1988
Regression
1992
Various
1994
Regression
197 0 -1 97 8
Regression
1 97 8 -1 99 3
Capitalization
1992
Regression
197 9 -1 98 3
Regression
1980-1981
Regression
198 6 -1 98 9
Regression
198 9 -1 99 3
Regression
1992
Capitalization
1984
Regression
1992
Appraisal
1983

Location
$/BLMAUM
$/FSAUM
NW Colorado
44
23
NW Colorado
11
16
Colorado
7 1-76
Utah
10
20
Utah
30
30
Utah
22
22
Utah
42
42
Arizona
13
23
New Mexico
46
49
New Mexico
5 6-74
7 9-97
New Mexico
71
82
New Mexico
93
93
New Mexico
68
68
New Mexico
100
150
New Mexico
125
145
New Mexico
8 0-90
60-10 5
New Mexico
75
70
New Mexico.
89
72
New Mexico
87
60
E. Oregon
As deeded
As deeded
E. OR & Nev
37
37
Oregon
36
Wyoming
6 4-22 0
142-275
Wyoming
55
Wyoming
0 or 12
46-66
Wyoming
0-59
188
Wyoming
36
47
Idaho
29
29
Idaho
37
42
11 States Ave
68
68
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The first serious attempt at evaluating permit value was published by B.
Delworth Gardner in 1962. He discovered that the permit value, tabulated
through a survey of ranchers who had recently bought or sold allotments, was
much lower than the value he expected to find using the capitalization method.
He thought the difference was due in part to, "transfer restrictions [which]
may be preventing permits from moving to ranches (ranchers) where they
would have greater economic value." He also found that 44% of Forest Service
permits in the study area were reduced upon transfer, and in some of these
areas there was an expectation that cuts would continue in the future, further
reducing

perm it

value.

For BLM allotments considered in that study, reductions were not a
significant factor. Gardner’s argument is that for BLM allotments the greater
differential between the surveyed value ($10.92) and those expected through
capitalization ($44.33) is due to transfer restrictions that were even more
limiting than those of the Forest Service. Although it is true that BLM transfer
restriction are more limiting, as BLM allotments cannot be transferred with
the sale of livestock, this argument is not very convincing. Since BLM
allotments almost always abut to the deeded ranch, and are sometimes even
enclosed by the ranch they

are tied to, they are almost certainly

to that ranch, rather than another ranch further

more valuable

away. Rimbey,who also

predicts permit value through the capitalization method, had a more
reasonable explanations for

this discrepancy, for he includes expenses

that

Gardner does not for BLM lands, bringing the value predicted by capitalization
down to a value similar, to Forest Service lands. Others have noted that BLM
lands tend to be less productive than Forest Service lands.
Values calculated for permits using capitalization methods are clearly
dependent on both the expected

monthly savings for forage and

the
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capitalization rate used, as well as the formula used t o , figure the value of the
capitalized savings. Methods used to figure this capitalized value vary.
Workman and Gardner both use a "simple" formula that divides the expected
A

savings by the capitalization rate: (Value of forage) - (Cost of forage)/
(Capitalization rate). However Workman uses a capitalization rate of 8%,
compared to 6% for Gee et al.
Rimbey also uses a capitalization rate of 8%, but uses a different formula to
figure out how much a "prudent investor" would pay for a permit (5):
Assuming the annual cash cost savings remains constant over a period
of years, we can derive an estimate of the amount a prudent investor
would pay to take advantage of these cost savings. The investor should
be willing to invest up to the net present value (NPV) of the stream of
benefits (or cost savings) or,
n
NPV = E
j= l

(PVTn - BLMnl
(l+i)n

w h e re :
j
i
PVTn
BLM

= years from 1 to n
= interest rate
= private costs year n
= BLM costs year n

Using this equation he finds that. "With a 30 year investment period and
8 percent discount rate, the net present value of the $2.59 cost savings would
be $29 per AUM."
Gee et al. do not actually figure out the per AUM permit value of the ranch
values that they are studying, but in two cases permit value can be calculated
from the figures he uses. In breaking down the worth of a Central Mountain
Colorado ranch, he places the value of 1790 AUMs at $135,750, after calculating
that $7.50/month savings would be capitalized at 10%. This divides out to a
permit value of $75.84/AUM. For another ranch he places the value of 910
AUMs at $65,000, with a $3.58/month savings calculated at 12%, for a permit
value of $71.43/AUM. The variation in capitalization rates is explained by

Figure 2:

Grazing perm it values in New Mexico, 1 9 6 6 -1 9 9 4 .
From Torell et al. 1994.
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regional differences in production and in real estate market value. Gee et al. do
not make clear what formula they use for capitalization.
If each of these studies used only the same "simple" method for
capitalization, Gardner, Rimbey, and Workman's data would show, for their
increased values of BLM forage calculated at $2.66, $2.59, and $2.89
respectively, only a small variance in range of permit values ranging from
$32-$36. In contrast, Rimbey finds the increased value o f Forest Service forage
to be $0.52, compared with $1.38 for Gardner, and up to $7.50 for Gee et al.,
making the range of permit values (again using the simple method at 8%) to
be $7 for Rimbey, $17 for Gardner, and $45 and $94 for Gee et al. The last two
figure are clearly much higher, but they are for specific ranches and not
averages for a set of data on ranch sales. They could be reflecting unusually
beneficial allotments. In any case, the figures for estimating permit value
though the capitalization method are clearly dependent on the expected
savings from public land forage and the formula used.
Permit values determined through surveys appear consistent with various
factors that will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. In brief, they
generally increase over time, partly due to inflation and partly due to an
increase in ranch values over and above the inflation rate. They also reflect
higher values associated with the year-round allotm ent leases generally found
in New Mexico and Arizona. The study with the eleven state average seems to
find unusually high permit values, but its results come from data reflecting
the period that is generally considered the height for both ranch and permit
v a lu e s.
The first attempt at using regression analysis to determine permit value was
done by Martin and Jefferies for Arizona ranches sold from 1957-1963. They
tried twelve different formulations on a relatively simple model with only six
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variables, from which they chose four equations that gave similar results:
values of $13/AUM for BLM leases and $23/AUM for Forest Service leases. These
values are lower than other values found for year-round leases of that era.
This can be explained in part because their procedure was, "based on the
rancher's actual use of the land rather than th e . agency-suggested stocking
*
rates. This procedure increases the animal-units figure on "section 15 BLM
lands by a factor of about two." They do not indicate the extent of section 15
lands compared to section 2 and 3 lands, but if the agency-suggested levels
were used,

the AUM value for those lands would presumable double. Another

factor that

might

have influenced their results was the use of deeded acres as a

factor, rather than deeded AUMs. Intuitively, it would make sense to used the
latter, considering all the leases were measured in AUMs. Later regression
models do

make that change.

The most extensive set of regression models used to determine permit value
have been done by Torell and his student Kincaid, in combination with a
number of other scholars. They have done numerous studies of ranch and
permit values in New Mexico from 1979 to 1994, which follow the work of
Fowler and Gray who studied the same values through surveys from

1966-1979.

(See Figure 2.) They found that changes in permit values generally follow
changes in

ranch values and that both peaked around

1982.

The results from the three studies by Sunderman and Spahr, looking at data
from sales between 1979 and 1993 in Wyoming, are based on models that differ
from those used in New Mexico, and most of their results are inconsistent with
other studies of permit value. They were the only ones to find no permit value
for any set of BLM leases, and their results for Forest Service leases during two
of the three periods studied were much higher than expected. I cannot explain
their results. One factor that may have influenced their results from studying
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175 sales was the inclusion of sales taking places through auction (16) and
repossession (63). Other studies did not include such sales.

FACTORS INFLUENCING PERMIT VALUE
Looking . through the variety of permit value studies, despite some variation,
one of the

most remarkable aspects of the accumulated results is their general

consistency. With the exception of the results for BLM allotments in
Sunderman and Spahr, every study found that permits had value
consistently

Studies also

found that permit values peaked around 1982, after an era

generally rising

values for ranches.

They also found

allotment leases in New Mexico consistently had

more

of

that year-round
value per AUM

(typically about double) than allotments in states to the north that could only
be used for part of the year.
Most of the studies of permit value agreed that "with reasonably simple
explanations, location, year, and length of grazing season can be identified as
basic factors

influencing permit values. Some studies also identified

a . few

other factors that were likely to influence permit values, through the
influence that they could have on either fee levels or AUM levels. These
include the
decisions

passing of new environmental laws and some federal court

on how to implement those laws. Also noted

were some trends in

national politics

that could affect the stability of fee orAUM levels,

particularly

"Sagebrush

the

Rebellion"

and the

controversies

surrounding

Clinton/Babbitt RR '94 measures. On a more localized level, the likelihood of
reductions in

AUMs due to the ecology of the region, grazing

practices, the

presence of endangered species, and the enforcement practices of federal
officials also influenced

permit values. The degree -that these issues

effect permit value is difficult to determine.

actually

the
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ESTIMATING THE TOTAL NATIONAL VALUE OF PERMITS
In 1968, Roberts and Nielson published what is probably the first attempt to
make some estimate of the collective worth of federal grazing permits. They
were estimating the loss of permit value if fees were raised to the full value of
the forage. They took their estimate of $10/AUM for BLM leases in Utah and
used simple multiplication to find a value of $13.5 million for 1.35 million
AUMs. They also noted that implementing such a fee increase would mean an
additional yearly cost to ranchers of $434,000 annually.
In 1980, in "Economic Analysis in Public Ranchland Management," Nelson
estimates that, "The total capital value of all grazing on BLM rangelands is
very likely no more than $1 billion." In their 1996 work, "Market Forces Would
Benefit US Rangelands," Holechek and Hess estimate that 25-30% of all federal
AUMs could be purchases for less than $420 million, making the total worth of
all federal AUMs less than $1.68 billion.
In 1993 there were 13,303,068 BLM AUMs and 8,7.65,829 Forest Service AUMs
for a combined total of 22,068,897 AUMs (USDI BLM). Using $150/AUM, one of
the highest permit values found for year-round allotments, the total permit
value for all allotments would be $3.31 billion. Using the 11 state average
permit value level of $68, the combined permit value would be a bit over $1.5
billion. Since this figure comes from one of, the years with the highest permit
values, the current average is probably closer to $50/AUM, which would give a
total national permit value of $1.1 billion.

CHAPTER 4
PERMIT VALUE AS A FACTOR OF RANCHERS' POLITICS:
How Important

This chapter

attempts to characterize how important permit value is to

ranchers with allotments, and to identify its
environmentalists,

Is It?

significance to other ranchers,

academics and public land managers. This discussion

and

the results' of the informal survey that are presented, clearly are not and are
not intended as a wide-scale sociological study or survey of this issue. Instead
this chapter will only attempt to reveal the wide variety of insights and
reactions of individuals close to the issue, through their own words and
explanations. The hope is to illustrate the range of both emotional and
intellectual responses to permit value, and to some degree, to the wider issues
in the continuing controversy over managing public land grazing. My theory
is that an unbiased presentation of these beliefs may help expedite reform
e ffo rts .
It must be understood that the survey conducted as part of this thesis is
informal in nature, due to the following two factors. The first is the sample
size. Although the total number of interviews (43) approaches a significant
sampling, the results are broken down and interpreted by category (i.e.
academic, land manager, etc.), and the sample size in each category is clearly
not large enough for clear numerical results from a statistical analysis.
Why bother with a survey that does not produce clear numerical results? For
the purpose of this thesis, there are three reasons. First, one of the principle
aims of this work is to show that permit value is an important factor in
ranchers' political motivations, and thus any positive responses indicating its
importance are significant, even if they are subjective. Second, this survey
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6 1
was always intended to be used along with the specific economic and historical
evidence presented in the earlier chapters and

not intended to stand on its

own. Finally, the process of conducting the surveys was an important tool to
open up the discussion about permit value with the interviewees and put it in
the context of the larger debate over public land grazing.
The other factor that makes this survey informal is the discussions between
the author and the interviewees. Although the complete intent of the survey
was not revealed, the interviewees did
"blind." For most, in order to get

not go into the survey completely

them to take the survey, they had to know

something about me and the topic. Also, while each question was asked in a
specific order, and specifically worded, during the interviews some of the
questions needed further explanation for some of the interviewees. Also,
between answers other issues were sometimes broached and discussed before
returning

to the

survey

questions.

THE SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The

Q uestions
The questions used in the survey are presented in Appendix A. There are

three sets of questions, each posed to different groups. The questions in each
set are grouped into six sections,

with each section containing one or more

specific questions. The questions in the first four sections sets vary to reflect
/

the group they are addressing. The questions in the first three sections in
each set cover issues not directly related to permit value and are not collated.
The results of the last three questions are specific to permit value and are
shown in Tables 4-6.
The questions in Section One were designed to elicit the background of the
interviewees and their experience with ranching. For perm ittees, Section Two
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asks for background on their allotments, and for ranchers without allotments,
whether they ever had
asks for the ranchers'

an allotment. This is followed by Section Three that
perception of the allotment system. For all other groups,

it is Section Two that asks for their perception of the allotment system and
Section Three that asks for suggested changes to the allotment system.
The questions in Section Four seek to confirm the existence of permit value
and to get an estimate from each interviewee of the permit value of a federal
allotment AUM. For ranchers with allotments, they are asked the value of their
allotments' AUMs, For all other groups the question is not asked of a specific
allotment. All

groups are then asked whether permit value is increasing or

d e c re a s in g .
Section Five asks the question at the core of this thesis, "How big of an
influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits is in the
resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?” This question was chosen
because the resistance to AUM cuts takes place on local, regional and national
levels. It can

be seen in the permittees' interactions with the agencies during

the development of AMPs, which are often developed in part through
negotiation with agency officials. The resistance often becomes more apparent
if an AMP is

appealed up the ladder of agency decision-makers. These appeals

can end up in

Washington D.C., or occasionally in the courts. This resistance

comes from

individual ranchers, various

ranching

associations,

and

sometimes

banks or politicians. The resistance is also reflected in proposed national
le g is la tio n .
Section Six assumes that much of ranchers' resistance to AUM cuts is
financial, and asks for reactions to two possible measures that would mitigate
some of that financial impact. Section Six originally had two questions: "How
would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM
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reductions?" and "How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire
an allotment for compensation?" After about a dozen interviews the first
question was split into two questions after it became clear that the answers to
it varied depending on why the reductions were called for. The two questions
distinguish whether the reductions were due to the prioritization of other
uses, or due to overgrazing. The interviewees who were not a sk e d . both
questions had their answers tabulated only with the answers to Question 6a.
•N.

During the interviews, the question arose as to whether a retired allotment
would ever be grazed again, as some of the interviewees were afraid that

the

flora in allotments that are not grazed would become decadent, as it got
overgrown, dried out and fail to re-seed, thus becoming a potential fire hazard.
When these issues came up, the question was clarified to allow for the
possibility that the area could be grazed under agency prescription for
ecological

The

considerations.

S election

P rocess

In selecting individuals to be interviewed, there were four basic criteria
that influenced the process: regional diversity, diversity of background,
familiarity with the issue, and a willingness to undergo the survey. Academics,
officials, environm entalists,

the reporter and farm credit bureau employees

knowledgeable and willing to discuss permit

value were not difficult to find.

Academics were chosen who had published articles focusing on permit value
or related issues. I made contact with many of the environmentalists at a
grazing conference sponsored by the National W ildlife Federation. Most of the
officials were found through phone calls to

various agency offices.

During the interviews with members of the previous groups, I asked them
for contacts with ranchers who might be willing to talk about permit value
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and take the survey. Approximately half of the ranchers and the banker

were

found through this process. Three others were found through a personal
contact who came from a
were found

ranching family in Montana. Five other ranchers

through contacting

various

cattlemen's

associations

for

re fe re n c e s.
Initially, I hoped to get at least five interviewees in each category. As the
interviews were taking place I decided to do more than five to help provide
more regional diversity, as

many of my initial contacts were in Montana.

Remarkably, all but one of

the individuals that I asked agreed to be

interviewed. During the process it also became clear that the interviewees'
knowledge of permit value, varied. The individuals who were interviewed,
along with their city of residence, are listed in Appendix B.

C ond ucting

the

Survey

The interviews took place from May to August of 1997. The original intention
was to conduct most of the interviews in person, during a trip around the West.
Ultimately it became clear that would be impossible due to limited time and
resources, so all except five interviews were conducted over the phone. One o f
the in-person interviews was conducted on the campus of the University of
Montana, and three were at the homes of ranchers near Ennis, Montana.
During an initial phone contact, one interviewee requested to receive the
questions over e-mail. This was done and he responded in kind.
In my attempt not to influence the result of the survey, the interviewees
were initially to ld . very little about either me or the survey. They were told
that I was a graduate student from the University of Montana, who was
working on issues in grazing economics and seeking to move the grazing
d ebate. forward by creating new options in public land management. Most did
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not know what department I was in, although I did tell them if they asked, and
a few knew through previous contact.
They were also told that the survey was about permit value and that they
would be told more about the intention of the survey and given a chance to ask
questions after it was over. During the survey, many of the interviewees
needed clarification as to what specifically was meant by permit value, as some
had difficulty splitting up the year-to-year economic benefits of allotment
from the real estate value of allotments.
I
I n te r p r etin g

the

R esu lts

Most of the answers to the last three questions have easily interpretable yes,
no, or maybe answers. Two others, Questions 4b and 5, did have a range of
answers that presented some difficulty in categorizing. Also, many of the
interviewees did not give specific answers for Questions 4b and 4c. The
answers to Question 4b were sometimes presented in a range, which was
averaged for the survey results. Others had more than one answer, specifying
different permit value levels for different regions. Since there were so few
to ta l. answers, these extra answers were included in the results.
The answers to Question 5 were the m o st. difficult to interpret. The results are
presented in the categories, Major, Very, Somewhat, and, Minor/None. Not all
of the answers fit exactly into these categories. Some of the other answers
included, "The Biggest" or "THE Influence," which were included under
"major." Others included, "One of the biggest," and, "It's significant, up to 50%,"
which were put under, "Very." The responses, "Some," "Significant," and, "It
runs the gamut," where put under "Somewhat." "Not much," and "It's more the
year-to-year operational value— that indicates whether they'd have to sell,"
were put under, "Minor/None." Generally if there was doubt, the rule that was
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followed was to put the answers in a category that indicated the lesser
s ig n if ic a n c e .

THE SURVEY RESULTS
R anchers

W ith

A llotm en ts

The seven ranchers with allotments were generally happy with the
allotment system, although two believed that it needed significant changes and
others had various complaints. One thought that there should be more on-theground management and less time spent on planning. Others wanted more
flexibility and security in the system, such as longer leases or easier ways to
change allotment boundaries. Still others wanted more sidebars, i.e., a clearer
system of allotment management standards from the agencies.
The permittees were unanimous in believing that they paid something for
their allotments, whether it was due to permit value, estate taxes, the cost of
improvements, or simply, as one put it, "blood, sweat and tears." Of the seven,
three believed that permit values were decreasing, including one who thought
that his allotment had lost all of its value; The rancher who valued his AUMs at
more than $100 each was predictably from the Southwest, where year-long
grazing on allotments is prevalent.
The permittees' reaction to the importance of permit value in resisting AUM
reductions was mixed, covering the gamut from "none," to "the most important
factor." Some of the comments that came with the answer to this question are
revealing. One rancher thought that it was, "Not as big as it used to be. Most
[permittees] have already devalued their AUMs." Another thought it was a "big
factor with some ranchers, especially in the South[west]," and perhaps most
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revealing was the comment by Bud Eppers, President of the New Mexico Public
Lands Council, that permit value's influence was, "Extremely big-—depending
on their level of [dependence on] federal land."
Permittees also overwhelmingly (six to one) favored compensation for
reduced AUMs if the reduction was a result of an agency decision to benefit
other uses, although many clearly believed that there w eren’t many cases in
which such reductions were warranted, particularly

if the reductions were

the result of increased recreational use. Interestingly, however, the one who
opposed this plan favored compensation if "the resource [forage potential] was
actually

damaged."

Other permittees

vehemently

opposed giving compensation

for AUM reductions that were required due to overgrazing.
The permittees were evenly split over the possibility of developing a
voluntary allotment retirement system. Those opposed had comments such as,
"We shouldn't waste the renewable resource," or "the elk won't like it," and
thought it would limit the opportunities for new ranchers to get started.
Alternatively, some who favored the plan thought that there were, many
ranchers ready to retire, whose heirs did not want to go into ranching, but
who continued only to prevent the ranch from subdivision. Another assessed
the situation, stating, "Many allotments have gotten too expensive." One was OK
with this plan, but favored a grassbanking system, which will be discussed
extensively in the next chapter. The last wanted a "clear new system for
economics of the area, and some sort of lease for new users." The one who was
undecided believed, "Government shouldn't have to pay for everything," but
was more supportive if the money came from local governments or private
so u rc es.
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R an ch ers

W ith out

A llotm en ts

The eight ranchers without allotments had various opinions of the allotment
system, describing it as confusing, burdensome, and unfairly distributed. Half
thought that it subsidized the permittees, and two thought the fees should go
up. In describing permittees, one even said, "I've used the term, 'God's chosen,
people.' These ranchers have a competitive advantage. These ranches don't add
much to the local economy." In contrast, another rancher noted, "I'd love to
have seen the Sagebrush Rebellion. The feds should get out of land,
business...[and],..save

on

management and employees.

.These ranchers also consistently believed that allotments had permit value,
but they had very little knowledge or opinion of its dollar value or trend. One
noted, "Yes, they pay for them, but we own them, so they're paying for
something that they don't own." The nonpermittees also had very little direct
knowledge of the influence of permit value over the permittees' politics. Most,
through contact with ranchers who had allotments, understood that it

had

some influence, but had difficulty in determining the extent of that influence,
or realized that it varied extensively depending on individual circumstances.
The nonpermittees were generally not supportive of compensation for
forced reductions, disagreeing with any

more government buy outs or

subsidies, and they were completely unsupportive of any compensation for
reductions that were due to overgrazing. One disagreed with a compensation
system because, "The government can’t pay someone to give, up their way of
life." Another who agreed with some forms of compensation believed, "It's
much like a private right—even though

it isn't really."

The nonpermittees were evenly split over the possibility of compensation
for the voluntary retirement of allotments and thus more supportive of it than
of compensation for forced reductions. One compared the voluntary
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retirement plan to the dairy buy out. Those who did not support this plan
generally did not support buy outs or subsides, or believed the government
should not pay for something it owned anyway.

Academics

*

The seven academic interviewees were generally agricultural economists or
range ecologists. They had numerous suggestions for improving the allotment
system, including the removal of base property requirements, increasing the
option of taking "non-use" on allotments, and increasing data collection
because too many decisions were being made only from "professional
judgment." These issues will be discussed more extensively in the next chapter.
One academic offered this insight into the social and political atmosphere of
the

ranching

com m unity:

Part of the problem is that the ranching community is very defensive
because they're running scared. They’re, afraid that they're being shut
out, or that people want to shut them out and so they tend to develop a
sort of circle-up-the-wagon mentality. They try to protect everybody
when in fact there are some that don't deserve to be operating. Agencies
should have the clout to do something about those who are doing it
wrong, but they should also be able to reward the ones who are putting
in the extra effort.
These comments reflect some of the conversations that took place during the
survey, where many ranchers either admitted or complained that there were
poorly run allotments that made them all look bad. Some seemed to want the
agencies to be stricter, but few, if any, were asking for that publicly.
The academics were also unanimous in believing that permit value exists,
but they generally believed it to be on average less valuable than ranchers
did. The one who though its value was $100 or more was again for the
Southwest. Four saw it declining in value over the last few years, compared to
one

who saw a recent resurgence.

One noted that the decline was making,
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"bankers very nervous," as many of the permits were security on borrowed
m oney.
All of the academics believed that permit value had some significance to the
resistance of AUM cuts, with four of them believing that it was a major or the
biggest influence, and three thought it had some significance that varied with
*■
the rancher. One again tied permit value's-influence to its collateral value,
saying that it is, "The biggest single component, especially for ranchers with
loans still out." He also noted, "The problems with federal assessment
techniques is probably

second." Another academic thought tha.t, "Ranchers

have more of a cash flow problem than an equity problem," and similarly, that
the overall, "economy of the operation is a much bigger factor."
The academics were overwhelmingly in support of compensation plans, with
the exception of reductions that were called for due to overgrazing or misuse.
The one who supported compensation even for overgrazed land had an
important insight, finding that overgrazing is* "so often OK'd by the agency
that rancher shouldn't be blamed." Another who was wrestling with the idea
of compensating for required reduction thought, "Compensation needs to be
enough to replace forage." Yet another supported compensation despite noting
that it, "hurts communities both in PILT [payments in lieu of taxes] and in
general economic

G overn m ent

loss."

Land

M anagers

The eight public land managers who where interviewed had a variety of
opinions about the allotment system. Some thought it worked pretty well. One
saw the "permit system [as] out-of-date—a closed system, [with] lots of permit
related paperwork, and not enough focus on land management." Two others
thought a competitive bidding system may be better. All agreed that permit
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value existed, but only half saw a trend for that value and only two put a dollar
value on it.
Most of the land managers thought that permit value had some influence in
the resistance to AUM cuts, but many also believed that the lack of
understanding and education about ecological issues was an important
influence, as was the ranchers' general resistance to change. One official
stated, "Some will take a voluntary cut, if the AUM levels stays the same,"
*•*
noting that his agency often had an easier time negotiating in-the-field
changes in allotment season of use, as long as the total number of AUMs on
face of permit were not changed. This allows the permit to retain its collateral
and market value. One who believed that permit value was not significant
thought, "Most don't think in those terms. They're not planning on selling."
The managers also had a range of opinions on the compensation plans. They
generally supported compensation for forced reductions. One supporter of the
concept thought, "All carrots are positive," and another believed, "If it's based
on benefits for the public good, than it's no different from other takings. It
would ease the managers' job." Another who agreed with the idea thought,
"Better to give them other range first." One manager was, "Not in favor,
because that infers a property right." All but one of the managers were
clearly

against compensating permittees for reduction due to overgrazing.

Their comments included, "I'd hate to see bad ranchers rewarded for poor
management," and, "If it's based on the individual's poor management,
stewardship, or lack of cooperation, than there is a problem."
The widest range of opinions was on the voluntary compensation plan.
While one supporter thought, "That would save the taxpayer millions of
dollars. The compensation should be based on fair market," another thought it
was, "better to take away allotments upon the transfer, of land." Others were

72

worried about what the land would be used for if not grazed, saying, "I
wouldn't support it unless the next use was designated," or "No, it shouldn't be
left up to the discretion of the rancher. It should be more based on ecological
c o n s id e ra tio n s ."

Environmentalists
The seven environmentalists generally wanted to see some reductions in
public land grazing levels and as least one wanted, "to see all livestock
jem oved from all public land, or at least all high value land— [then] sell the
other to ranchers." They also wanted stricter enforcement of existing
regulations and better monitoring. One thought that the allotment system
would be better if the maximum permit was approximately for 350 head, or 10%
above economic requirement of what it takes to raise a family.
Only one environmentalist wasn't clear as to whether permit value existed,
but that activist worked exclusively in an area where the subdivision of
ranches was by far the major problem and where private land values has
skyrocketed, making permit value insignificant. The activists^ believed that in
some areas permit value ranged higher than $100/AUM, but generally found
permits to range from $25/AUM to S50/AUM, and were split on the trend of
that value.
The environmentalists' opinion of the significance of permit value had the
broadest split, with five of the interviewees thinking it was a major force and
two finding it relatively insignificant. Two activists clearly thought that the
influence of the banks was a big part of permit value's political significance.
One believed it to be the "driving force, [along with] the banks submitting
appeals [on AMPs]. The pressure to make loan payments makes the ranchers
run more cattle. There's $10 million [of collateral value locally] on 141
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allotments— [making it] a force still bigger than year-to-year income value,
especially in Southwest." One of the environmentalists who found permit value
insignificant thought that philosophical resistance

was

more

important,

citing the case where for a number of years, someone had been offering
ranchers $60,000 to give up their allotment, and had gotten no takers.1 9
Environmentalists favored compensation for forced AUM reduction four to
two, with one uncertain. These numbers, however, do not reflect the sentiment
of those who favored the plan nearly as much as one revealing comment:
"Don't like it. We should kick 'em off and give them a bill, but politically. I'd
grit my teeth and do it, if these are permanent reductions." Environmentalists
on both sides of this question did not believe that these reductions were
"takings" and wanted any new rules to reflect that belief.
T h e . tables were turned on the question of compensation for overgrazed
allotments, with four opposed, and two giving hesitant approval. One comment
illuminates the reasoning of one of the two in favor. "My emotional side balks
at it. The rational side says it will make it [restoring the land] easier. I've never
really seen any other reason than poor management for any reduction."
Another thought the plan did not go far enough, "I don't want to see it. If the
allotment isn't viable, then the whole allotment should be bought out, and
retired as a whole."
Despite two who were undecided, activists overwhelmingly approved
compensation for voluntary retirement. One who had disapproved of forced
compensation was, "OK with that. [It is] more of an incentive." Another
environm entalist’s sentiment echoed that of the land managers, as they had

19 I have not been able to find anyone else who could substantiate that offer.
In any case that arrangement would have legal problems under the current
allotm ent system.
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"mixed feelings, but the real question is how it is managed afterwards." Others
had different reservations, "I don't want to see a property right, but if the
[compensation] language works, then getting cows off is the priority.
Whatever we have to do is OK if it is permanent." Another noted cases where
ranchers had, "tried for years to close their allotments for habitat," without
success.

O th er

P a r tic ip a n ts

The six "other" interviewees, including a reporter, and assessor, a Realtor, a
banker, and two Farm Credit Service employees, had a wide range of
perspectives on what should be done with the allotment system. Two wanted
significant changes with the agencies. "The Forest Service should have more
confidence in ranchers... [they] should focus on true abusers and should back
good stewards with less regulation." Another thought, the agencies' "biggest
error is that they make decisions for the West as a whole." Two others saw
much broader problems, one stating, "Some areas of the Southwest never
should have been grazed," and another saw, "ranching as dying industry—
more and more controlled by big money."
‘
’

I

All of these interviewees confirmed the existence of permit value, with the
Realtor stating succinctly, "I know they do, because I sell them." As they had
ties to the financial community, not surprisingly, all of the interviewees but
the reporter had opinions as to both the level and trend of permit value, with
four thinking the trend was upward, two believing it was downward, and on
average they figured permits were worth between $50 and $100/AUM.
These interviewees also has a wide range of opinions on the significance of
permit value in the ranchers' resistance to AUM cuts. Some who thought it was
important also brought up the issue of year-to-year operational value.
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Another thought, "One of the issues is that they need bigger operations. They
need about 400 head to support a family. It's economy of scale. They must get
bigger to survive, but permits are decreasing." One who saw permit value as
insignificant believed that the last thing the rancher is thinking is, "I've got
to replace the ranch."
This set of interviewees was generally unsupportive of compensation for
forced reductions. One supporter believed that the plan was needed simply
because, "Wildlife is getting more and more AUMs allocated." In contract,
another thought, "It would open a can of worms. [It is] too subjective, too
variable. Land trades are better. It would be a cyanide-coated sugar pill." This
group was also completely unsupportive

of compensation

for overgrazing,

with one comment capturing their tone, "If land is beat, than no." The one who
was undecided realized it might be difficult to clearly put the fault on the
ra n c h e r.
This group was split on the possibility of compensating for the voluntary
retirement of allotments. Those who agreed with the plan did not have
extensive comments. One who opposed it said that his "business is to finance
agriculture.

They

want transition

from

generation

to generation."

Another

would, "rather see reductions. In most cases in this area, they need to be
grazed ."

A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS FROM VARIOUS SECTORS
Not surprisingly, there was a wide variety of concerns among the various
groups interviewed. Fee levels, subsides, permit value, long-term economic
stability, ecological and habitat concerns,

recreation values, the demise of

the

ranching way of life, agency monitoring

and bureaucracy, and the influx

of

subdivisions were all issues important to the interviewees.It is

clear from, the
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diversity of opinions on these issues that there will never be complete
agreement on these issues even among individuals within each group
surveyed, never mind among all the interests involved.
Nevertheless, there was nearly unanimous agreement o n . the existence of
permit value. There was, however, nearly an even split on Question 4c,
whether permit value was increasing or decreasing. This could in part be
because the question is not clear as to what year the increase or decrease
should be measured from. Also, some of those interviewed might associate
permit values more closely with land values than a careful economic analysis
would. It is also likely that some of the answers reflect local trends (perhaps
from the Realtor

and bankers), while others where looking at the national

trends (as the academics may have). On a local levels, it was generally believed
that permit .values decreased if

it was thought that land managers were about

to make some reductions, and increased somewhat after the reductions were
made. On the larger scale, with the gradual trend towards AUM
permit values would

reductions,

be in a gradual decline.

The range of answers regarding the dollar value of allotment AUMs varied
as expected, but
economic

was generally consistent with the variations found in regional

studies done by agricultural

economists. The responses generally

hovered around $50-60/AUM for seasonal allotments and a bit over $100/AUM
for allotments grazed year-round. It is important to note that many of the
interviewees seemed

to be guessing at these figures, or admitted they were

answering with figures that they had heard from other sources. Some of the
interviewees refused

tocome up with a generalized

figure. Not

surprisingly,

however, the permittees all had a answer for permit value levels. The only
other group that all responded to this question were the "others"—the bankers,
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Realtor and reporter. Both of these groups deal with permit values in their
w o rk .
TABLE 4: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 4
4a) Do you feel that
buy th eir ranch?

ranchers

Type
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o ta ls

Y es
6
8
7
8
6
6
41

pay

for

their

allotm ents

when

they

No
1
0
0
0
1
0
2

4b) How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth ■now as
part of the real estate value of a ranch?
T ype
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o ta ls

-50
3
1
4
1
2
1
12

4c)

over

Has

that

changed

T ype
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o ta ls

In creased
0
1
1
2
2
4
10

51-100
3
0
0
1
3
3
10
the

101->
1
0
1
0
0
1
3

years?
Declined
3
0
4
2
2
1
12

The results from Question 5 clearly indicated that permit value is an
important issue, at least as a reason why permittees resist cuts in their AUM
levels. Of the forty-one responses to this question, only 22% thought that
permit value was not factor. The remaining 78% found it to be at least some
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TABLE 5: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 5
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real
grazing perm its is in the resistance of ranchers
AUM levels?
Major
T ype
3
P e rm itte e s
1
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
4
1
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts 5
Other
1
TOTAL
15

Very
0
1
0
2
0
1
4

Somewhat
2
4
3
3
0
1
13

estate value
to cuts in

M inor/None
2
1
0
2
2
2
9

significance. Almost half (46%) found it of very or major significance, and
more than one-third (37%) thought it was a major influence in resisting AUM
cuts. Most of the interviewees who thought it was a major influence believed
that it was the most important factor in that resistance. The other issue that
came up consistently as an important factor in that resistance was the effect
AUM cuts had on the ranch's yearly operations and profits.
Unexpectedly, more than half the interviewees responding to Question 6a
supported compensating ranchers for forced AUM reductions that were
required due to endangered species and habitat concerns. O f the forty-one
responses, 59% supported the possibility, 24% opposed it, and 17% were
uncertain. This result was not much different than the results of the fifteen
ranchers, of whom 53% supported, 33% opposed and 13% were undecided.
Many of the supporters specified that the compensation needed to be "fair,"
and some mentioned that it should be enough to find replacement forage. Not
surprisingly, in Question 6b, 78% opposed compensating for AUM reductions
due to overgrazing, and only 16% favored the possibility, with 6% remaining
u n d e cid e d .

'

The results from Question 6c, on voluntary retirement of allotments, were
similar the result of Question 6a. Of the forty-three respondents, 56% supported
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the possibility, 30% were opposed, and 14% undecided. This idea was not quite
as favorable with ranchers, of whom seven supported it, seven opposed it, and
one was undecided. Much of the opposition and indecision was due to the
uncertainty as to what would happen to the land and how it would be managed.
A few were more supportive of the idea if the retired allotment would be put
into a grassbanking

system.

TABLE 6: RESULTS FROM INTERVIEW QUESTION 6
6a)
for

How would you feel about a system that com pensated ranchers
forced AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses?

T ype
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o ta ls
6b)
for

Y es
6
2
6
5
4
1
24

No
1
4
0
1
2
2
10

Maybe
0
2
1
1
1
2
7

How would you feel about a system that com pensated
forced AUM reductions due to overgrazing?

T ype
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o ta ls

Yes
1
0
1
1
2
0
5

No
3
7
3
4
4
4
25

Mayl
1
0
0
0
0
1
2

6c) How would you feel about a system that allowed
rancher to retire an allotm ent for com pensation?
Type
P e rm itte e s
N o n p e rm itte e s
A cadem ics
M a n a g e rs
E n v iro n m e n ta lis ts
Other
T o t a ls

Yes
3
4
7
2
5
3
24

No
3
4
0
3
0
3
13

ranchers

Mayl
1
0
0
3
2
0
6

a willing
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GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING THE SURVEY RESULTS
Permit value is clearly only one influence among many in ranching
politics, but an important one in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in AUM
levels. The overall degree of that influence is debatable, and its influence on a
rancher's politics and motivations varies from rancher to rancher. Other
influences include the loss of year-to-year income that is the result of lost
AUMs, ranchers' philosophical and emotional attachments to their way of life,
the permittees' desire to be left alone by the government and the general
public, their desire to retain open space, and other issues less often mentioned
and perhaps

less important.

The results of this survey clearly show that permit value is an element of
the public land grazing debate that needs more attention. Both further study
and debate over potential ways to address the issue are needed. Considering the
results of this small survey, a larger survey is recommended, with a wider
range of questions and clearly defined standardized answers that span a range
of possibilities (i.e. from 1 to 5, or a similar system), that can more easily
a n aly z e d .
If it becomes necessary to figure out the fair market value of allotments, I
would not recommend surveying ranchers as a method, for fear that they
might appraise allotment value too high if compensation was a possibility. In
fact, most of the information needed is already available. During one of the
interviews, it emerged that the Farm Credit Service has been doing its own
regional evaluations of permit value for at least ten years. I suspect many
agricultural banks have also done similar surveys. These, along with the
studies presented in Chapter Three, could be systematically combined to find
the fair market value of allotments in different regions and under the
m anagement

of

different

agencies.

Despite the diversity of opinions over these issues, there is some measure of
agreement. Whether there is enough to find workable solutions has yet to be
determined. Looking in more detail to the survey results, it is interesting to
note that thirty-one of forty-three participants (72%) responded yes to either
question 6a or 6c, and thirty-four (79%) responded either yes or maybe to one
of the two questions. This compiled result lends itself to the conclusion that a
properly and fairly designed compensation system could possibly get
widespread support. One possible option for such a system, along with other
possible grazing reform measures, will be explored in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 5
REFORM PROPOSALS & PERMIT VALUE:
How Well Will They Work

This chapter briefly explains some of the current reform proposals relating
to permit value. It analyzes each proposal, in part by considering the
conversations with the interviewees that occurred in addition to their answers
on the survey questions, Then it considers whether each proposal could be
implemented in a form that is acceptable to both the public land ranching and
environmental communities. Before discussing

the reform

proposals, a ,

number of . other public land grazing issues are exaniined in brief, so that they
can also be discussed, along with permit value, in relation to each reform
proposal. This reflects a concern that grazing reform primarily directed at
permit Value does not ignore other issues that could make it either
unacceptable

or

unw orkable.

THE ISSUES IN REFORMING PUBLIC LANDS GRAZING
Ranch

V iability

and

Local

Community

Econom ic

H ealth

For most ranchers, ensuring the continued viability of their operations is of
primary importance. Most do not want to see any reduction in the number of
livestock they run, and many do not want to see reductions in the acreage
grazed on public lands, as they think that grazing is good for the land. Many
ranchers also want their leases to last longer than ten years, to insure the
stability

of their operations.

If one goal of reform is the cooperation of the public lands ranchers, the
AUM reductions that are required should be done in a manner that is as least
threatening as possible. Reductions sho,uld be made as much as possible
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through voluntary

measures. Larger operators

should be encouraged to

sacrifice AUMs to provide forage for smaller operators facing reductions. If
possible, cuts should be made to larger operators and foreign interests before
smaller operators are cut. Where possible, efforts should be made to find
replacement forage, whether it comes from public

or private land.

Ranchers also think that ranching is socially and economically important to
(

their local communities, and point out how some economists argue that these
allotments

ultimately benefit rural economies, bring in tax money,

and

prevent the unemployment of

up to 28,000 ranchers. These

beliefs continue,

despite the studies that show

the West's economy changing rapidly, with many

western communities becoming less and less dependent on the ranching
industry. Still, in designing politically viable reforms, it is important to
consider that the ties ranchers

have to their communities are important

them, that these ties have existed historically, and that to varying

to the

degrees,

they remain important to the communities.

H abitat,

E cological

H ealth, and

R ecreation

V alues

It is not the point of this work to debate whether or how destructive
livestock grazing is, but it is important to consider how this issue effects
possible reform. Environmentalists point to a growing body of evidence
suggesting

that the effects of grazing are serious, especially if overgrazing is

allowed. In considering grazing reform, it must be

taken into account that

for

most environm entalists, their primary concerns are w ildlife habitat and the
long-term ecological health of public lan d .. Many also highly value
recreation potential of public

lands. Environmentalists vary

the

in the degree that

they see livestock grazing as harmful to these values. Most of them want

public land grazing to be reduced in many areas to protect these values. Some
even maintain that all livestock should be removed from public lands.
Clearly, most ranchers are also concerned about wildlife habitat and
ecological health, but compared to environmentalists, they generally do not
believe that livestock grazing is nearly as destructive to these values. Many
ranchers believed themselves to be "environmentalists," but those who do
would

generally

be

considered

conservationists

rather than

preservationists,

In general, however, ranchers focus their ecological concerns on the deer, .
elk and fish populations—species that are hunted and fished.
Ranchers generally would allow an area to be grazed longer than
environm entalists

would

before

considering

it

Overgrazed,

Environm entalists

are more cautious about grazing levels and their effects on riparian areas. For
reform measures to satisfy environmentalists, ranchers will have to be more
respectful of that tendency toward caution.

Perm it

V alue,

Loans

and

Finance

As the previous' chapters suggest, permit value is a significant issue that
needs to be addressed in effective grazing reform. Clearly ranchers have a
considerable financial investment in perm it value.

Ranchers

who have

outstanding loans or who have little ready cash and think they might need
loans, are even more attached to keeping their AUM levels and associated
permit values

stable.

Due to these, outstanding loans, and the official agreements that encourage
such loans to continue, many banks are very concerned about permit values.
Some banks have even appealed AUM reductions from allotments, and there is
little question that some banks encourage policy makers to maintain the
security of their loans, and the allotment system in general.
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G o v e rn m e n t

F in a n c e s

Grazing reforms should consider the question, "Does public land grazing
make economic sense?" Recognizing that this question is multidimensional
and has no simple answers does not make it irrelevant. In fact, it becomes even
more important as its complexities are examined. The question has to be put in
different contexts. What area of the public lands is going to be considered? The
economic issues can be looked at nationally, regionally, for small groups of
allotments, o r . for individual allotments. To focus the issue, what really needs to
be asked is, "From whose perspective does grazing make economic sense? From
the ranchers'? The communities'? The governm ents'? The taxpayers'? The
anglers'? The botanists'?" The answer is as varied as the perspective. To get a
sense of these complexities, the following discussion looks briefly at the
economics of the allotment system for the ranching industry and for the
ta x p a y e r.
For the ranchers, there is little question that most of the allotments in the
current system benefit them economically. They also point to their allotments'
benefits to their local community from the revenue sharing system of grazing
fee receipts, and remind us that the money their businesses bring into their
communities needs to be considered in the economic equation. The ranching
industry claims that ranchers need the benefits from their allotments, as they
are faced with a variety of hardships that hit the small operators hardest,
including the low price of beef, competition for land and forage from other
users, and higher overhead. Many ranchers also think that the government is
paying too much for administrating the allotment system.
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Despite the overall benefits of federal allotments for the ranching
i n d u s t r y , s o m e allotments are being abandoned either because of lack of
interest or high operating costs. Even considering that during the last few
years, grazing fees have been some of the lowest in many years, some
allotments are expensive to maintain and of marginal economic value to
ranchers.
Viewed from the taxpayers' perspective, there is no question that the federal
government spends more money oh managing the allotm ent system than it
brings in to the treasury. After compiling the 1993 figures from the BLM and
Forest Service, the RR '94 DEIS found that grazing fee receipts brought in
$28,112,000, of which $14,044,000 went into the Range Betterment Fund for
range improvements, $5,869,000 went towards payments to states and counties,
and only $8,172,000 went back to the US treasury (USDI, BLM 3-73). The report
also states, "Average administration costs for the 1993 programs were
$3.21/AUM for the BLM and $3.24 for the Forest Service" (USDI, BLM G-4). This
puts the total administration costs for the BLM at $42,702,848 and $28,401,286
for the Forest Service. The total administrative costs of $71,104,134 means a loss
to the treasury of $62,932,134, and the report makes it clear that there are
potentially other social and environmental costs that should be assessed to the
grazing program, along with the costs of other lost uses.
Other sources have radically different estimates. Gharles Wilkinson
estimates that the total grazing subsidy on all federal lands is about $37 million
annually (112). Hess, Knowles, and Knowles estimate that the total costs to the
BLM and Forest Service are closer to $150 million/year, when overhead and

"An estimate of the costs differential between permittees and nonpermittees
suggests that nonpermittee costs were almost $105 per cow higher than
permittee costs" (USDI, BLM 3-70).
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other miscellaneous agency costs are considered (39). Jacobs tallies the total
tax expenditures to maintain public land grazing at over $1 billion/year, but
he includes the cost of fire protection, roads, animal and insect control, flood
protection

and

vegetation

management.

It is unlikely that the disparity between these economic viewpoints will be
settled anytime soon. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that one of the
original reasons for charging fees was to insure that the administrative costs
of the grazing program were covered. Clearly, any grazing reform would do
well to insure that in the long-term, the costs and benefits to the taxpayers
achieve some sort or parity. On the other hand, the reforms should consider
how the allotment system assists the public lands ranchers, and focus any
reductions to allotment AUMs so that they have as little economic impact as
possible to those ranchers.
Further, if any grazing reform calls for significant grazing reductions, the
money that goes to the states and counties in the form of grazing receipts
needs to be addressed. Any reform that calls for AUM reductions is likely to be
more acceptable to ranching communities if it includes a mechanism to
replace grazing receipts

L e a s in g

with money from another source.

R e q u ir e m e n ts

The Forest Service and BLM both have specific requirements that dictate
who can hold an allotment permit or lease and under what conditions. The
Forest Service requires that their permittees have the forage and water to
maintain their livestock during the time that their animals are not grazing on
the allotments. They also have an upper limit to the number of AUMs that a
permittee can hold. The BLM gives a preference for their allotments leases to
the ranches closest to the allotment. There are some ranchers and economists
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who argue the agencies should get rid of these requirements and allow
allotments to be exchanged more easily, so they end up attached to the ranches
where they will be of most economic benefit. Environmentalists tend to
believe that there should be AUM limits, but usually do not have strong
opinions on these other issues.

Should

G razing

Be

Required?

The Forest Service and BLM both require that allotments be grazed. There
are exceptions granted for drought

or lack of forage. These

exceptions

are

generally allowed for only two or three years, but occasionally can be longer
if circumstances warrant. There is a growing agency practice o f giving
allotments an extended rest, usually after negotiating with the ranchers, in
order to restore floral and riparian health.
Currently, however, it is still illegal for an allotment holder simply to decide
for themselves not to graze an allotment. Most environmentalists want to
change this requirement, so that individuals or groups could lease allotments
that they believed are important for habitat or recreation, and rest them from
grazing. Babbitt's RR '94 would have allowed allotment holders to rest their
allotments, but that issue was opposed by the ranching industry and is on
appeal in the courts, having recently been ruled against
Clearly, this is an important issue

in W yoming.2 1

to address in grazing reforms.

21 In the same decision, the practice of consistent understocking was ruled
illegal by the Federal District Court of Wyoming. Public Lands Council v.
United States Department o f Interior, 929 F. Supp 1436 (1996).
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M anagem ent

R e sp o n sib ility

and

Input

Judging from the conversations with the interviewees and others, both
ranchers

and environm entalists

want more input into

managing

grazing on

public lands. On one hand, the ranchers often feel misjudged by the agencies'
range specialists, believing that the officials make many of their
recommendations after only looking at the worst conditions on their
allotments. On the other hand, grazing activists often claimed that their
comments are not listened to, and that their appeals of AMPs and EAs fall on
deaf ears, thus leading to lawsuits. Although this issue is generally unrelated
to permit value, it may be important to address in grazing reforms.
The other major debate that comes up over allotment management is the
question of who can comment on and appeal AMPs. There is a movement in the
ranching industry to get the law changed so that appeals would be limited to
parties who are "affected interests," with the definition of "interest" focused
on economic impacts. Environmentalists believe that since the grazing is on
public land, any citizen should be able to comment on or appeal these plans.

Monitoring/Sidebars
Much like the issue of management responsibility, the reform of monitoring
is not directly related to permit value. The level of monitoring of different
allotments varies between the agencies and can vary extensively from region
to region. Monitoring is an important issue to both ranchers and activists.
Activists generally want more and better monitoring of allotments. Ranchers
generally think that the standards that are being monitored for need to be
much clearer and enforced more uniformly. Many want to get rid of the AUM
number limits for allotments and base the use of allotments on these new
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monitoring standards, often termed "sidebars," that are based only on
en v iro n m en tal

co n sid eratio n s.

The

for

Potential

Floral

D ecadence

Many ranchers fear that if allotments are not grazed, the grasses will dry up
and brown out over the season. They claim that deer and elk do not like the
brown grasses, preferring grasses that have been grazed early in the season
and are sprouting new green shoots. They believe that after a few years
without grazing, the grasses will stagnate and fail to re-seed. They also believe
that the allotments that are not grazed will become fire hazards.
Environmentalists usually dismiss these concerns as not backed by
historical or ecological facts. They note the historical records from the
travelers throughout the Great Plains and Rockies, before the
and cattle, that found

influx of sheep

tall and lush grasses. Still, if grazing reform does

remove

grazing from some allotments, then the reforms should insure that these areas
are monitored and that management options are provided that will prevent
them from going decadent and becoming hazardous.

POSSIBLE PUBLIC LAND GRAZING REFORMS
Fee

Level

Changes

Increasing grazing fees is undoubtedly the most debated grazing reform,
and usually leads to disputes between the ranching and environmental
communities. With grazing fees currently at S1.36/AUM, except for some of
those who think that

ranchers should be rewarded for good stewardship, there

are only a few people asking for a reduction in grazing fees. There are,
however, a number of voices calling for a fee increase as a solution to some of
the problems with public land grazing. The possibility of a fee increase raises

9 1
a number of questions, some hotly debated: What would a fee increase do to
ranches? How do fee level changes affect permit value? What might a fee
increase do for the taxpayer, or the health of the land? There is no question
that an increase in grazing fees would cost ranchers more and reduce their
profits. Almost everyone agrees that increasing fees would decrease both the
desirability and permit value of allotments.
The real debate over increasing grazing fees involves whether it would
ultimately benefit the land. Ranchers argue that as fees increase, more
ranches will go out of business, leading to decadent grasses, and either more
subdivisions in areas of increasing populations, or job loss and community
disruption in areas with stable or decreasing populations. Many also believe
that a fee increase will lead to more overgrazing, as ranchers add more
livestock to the land in an attempt to make up for lost profits.
Environmentalists argue that increasing fees will cover more of the
agencies' costs of managing the grazing programs, and give them more money
for monitoring. Many also believe that fees should be raised gradually until
permit values reach zero. Some would do this simply because they believe that
permit value should never have existed in the first place, others because they
think allotments benefit only a very narrow class, not even including all
ranchers. Others think that without the additional motive of retaining permit
values, ranchers will be less protective of their AUM levels and more willing
to accept AUM reductions that might prevent overgrazing. They also believe
that increasing fees would end up removing grazing from the more
economically marginal allotments, which they believe are often the
allotments that have already been damaged from overgrazing.
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The

Dom enici

and

Sm ith

Bills

The recent reform efforts introduced first by Senator Domenici and then

by

Representative Smith (R-OR) have also generally led to controversy, as they
focus on insuring the security

of ranches by lengthening leases

to fifteen

years, lim iting public input in allotment management, and making grazing
the priority use of these public lands. Environmentalists are nearly
unanimous in opposition to these reforms, with many angered by what they
see as an attempt to limit the public's rights. Despite their controversial
nature, it is important to question what these reforms would really do to the
public land grazing

system. Would they really improve the ranchers' security?

Would they improve habitat or the productivity of the land? How would longer
leases affect permit values and property values?
If these reforms came about, it is likely that both the ranchers
banks would feel more secure about the stability of the allotment
their local

communities. If the reforms generally stabilize AUM

permit and property values are

and the
system and
levels, then

likely to remain stable or even increase. With

grazing levels stable, these reforms would also reduce concerns about
potential floral decadence, but would not do anything to change leasing or
monitoring

requirements. Additionally, since fewer people could

appeal, the

taxpayers might also save money because officials would spend less time on
a p p e a ls.
Supporters of the bills argue that if ranchers could count on the continued
use of their allotments at present levels, than that enhanced security would
encourage them to take better care of the land. Many also argue that since the
ranchers would be more protective of their forage, their efforts would work to
prevent overgrazing,

thus also helping habitat. It makes sense that if these

reforms were enacted, ranchers who already have made sacrifices and
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investments to take better care of the land would then make further
investments

and continue to protect their previous

investments.

Environmentalists have a different argument. They believe that although
some cases of overgrazing take place through ignorance of good management
practices, more often it occurs because a rancher is financially troubled. At
times, these indebted ranchers attempt (illegally) to run even more cattle on
allotments simply to try to pay their bills or pay off their loans. Although this
would not happen in every case, there is nothing in these reforms to prevent
ranchers

who abused their allotments from

continuing

that destructive

practice. They believe that these bills really do not protect the leaseholders
who need it the most, and only provide them a false sense of security. In fact,
they think these bills trap the poorer ranchers in a loose net of governmental
Subsides, and bind their livelihood to marginal allotments. This leaves the less
fortunate ranchers trying to eke out a living from those marginal allotments,
with one of their biggest expenses being the loans that they took out to pay for
both their ranches' property value and the permit value of their allotments.

S ellin g

A llotm en ts

To

R anchers

One potential reform that has been suggested since the beginning of the
allotment system is the possibility of selling off these lands. Those who suggest
this usually would give the ranchers first preference in purchasing them.
Some have even suggested that the allotments should be given to the ranchers,
following the spirit and custom of the Homestead Act. Along with the previous
set of questions raised about each reform, this possibility raises some unique
issues: How would the price of the allotments be determined? Would the
ranchers actually be given first preference, and if not, could corporate or
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foreign interests buy these lands? Would there be limits on development?
Would the ranchers even buy them?
This plan clearly takes care of the issues of monitoring, management
responsibility,

and

leasing requirem ents, because

without allotm ents,

these

issues would disappear. With continued grazing, there would also be little
potential for decadent grasses. If ecological costs are not considered, then this
option would almost surely save the taxpayers some

money by

reducing the

costs to the agencies, and it would provide a short term income to the treasury
from the sales. It is also a potential boon to some communities, due to an influx
of property taxes.
Many advocates of this option have a libertarian philosophy that objects to
having any public land. Some also believe that the ranchers would take better
care of the land they owned, and that overall the plan would lead to significant
improvements in ranch viability and local community economic health, along
with better habitat and ecological health. Others, including a few
environmentalists, simply believe it would save the

taxpayers money.

W ithout the rules, regulations, and uncertainty of the allotment leasing
systems, at first glance it would seem that the stability of ranches would
increase. On further analysis, however, that may not be the case. There are
many who believe that this plan would not work, because the ranchers

either

would not be able to afford the allotments to begin with, or if they did
purchase them, they would be strapped with both additional loans and
additional property taxes that would add up to be significantly more than
grazing fees. Thus the plan would actually lead to widespread ranch
instability, or the disappearance of the small family

ranch. On the other hand,

if the privatization of allotments was set up to minimize these costs to the

ranchers, than the benefits to the treasury and local communities would also
be minimized.
In the conversations with interviewees, it became clear that all the
environmentalists and many of the ranchers opposed the privatization of
public land, especially if there was any chance that it would lead to developing
these lands. Many also agreed with the results of the Reagan initiated study,
President's Private Sector Survey on

Cost Control, which questions whether

there would be interest in buying these public lands. Since that study, some of
the land has increased in value, but

generally for its development potential

and not fot its forage.
Environmentalists completely disagree with the analysis of this plan done
by its supporters. They do not believe that the ranchers would take better care
of land they owned if there was no monitoring program or means to limit
grazing levels. They think that in many cases overgrazing would increase
with the increased financial pressure on the ranchers. Privatization would
also limit public access to these lands, reducing recreation options and their
economic benefits to the communities. Left without the laws and regulations of
the current leasing systems,

some environmentalists also envision that they

would end up relying increasingly on the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act to protect habitat and water quality, which would create even more
controversy as these laws would have

Open

M arket

Bidding

For

Grazing

to be applied to more private land.

Permits

Opening up grazing permits to the highest bidder is one of the most often
suggested grazing reforms, in part because .it 'has been or is currently being
used in various formulations by some states, tribes, and federal agencies. These
bidding systems vary in duration, as to whether the bids are open or closed,
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and as to what additional services are provided, but most will only allow
ranchers’ bids to be accepted. In almost all instances, open market bidding
brings in higher fees than the current fees of the BLM and Forest Service.
Exceptions exist in areas where there is little competition for the allotment or
if the allotment is in poor condition.
If a bidding system was implemented, a number of issues would have to be
settled: Who could bid? Would subleasing be allowed? What type of monitoring
system would be put in place? Who would pay for the improvements that
ranchers previously invested in for their allotments? Would the ranchers who
*
currently have their allotments get some sort of preference in the bidding
process? Would permit value be compensated for in any way? For both
ranchers or environmentalists, how the bidding system was set up would make
a big difference in their evaluations as to whether to support or oppose it.
The public land ranchers are unlikely to support instituting a bidding
system unless the leases were for multiple years, and the ranchers who
previously leased the allotment were compensated for both their
improvements and their investment in its permit value. Even then, many
would likely believe that a bidding system would detract from their industry's
and communities' security. They might be more likely to support bidding for
allotments currently are not being leased, or if bidding was instituted for a
ranch's allotments only after the ranch was sold. Generally ranchers are also
opposed to having allotments bid on if the bidder does not intend to graze
them, especially if the allotments are currently being grazed.
Environmentalists generally support instituting a bidding system over the
current allotment system. They think that it would bring in more income,
allowing the allotment system to pay for itself. They also believe that whether
or not ranchers were initially compensated for it, a bidding system would get
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rid of permit value. Further, without permit value it is likely that a bidding
system would lead to less opposition by ranchers if AUM reductions were called
for, in part because reductions could be implemented between bidding cycles
and because the ranchers would have less financial stake in maintaining
I

'

.

allotment levels. Activists also support more frequent bidding cycles, because
more cycles would allow the agencies to re-evaluate grazing levels more often.

Free

M arket
There is a

Bidding

For

V ariable

Use A llotm ents

growing debate on few proposals that would not only open up

allotments for competitive bidding, but would also Open them up to different
types of uses. One possible new use is simply resting the allotment, but various
options include giving the leasee varying degrees of priority use of the
allotm ent for camping, hiking,
plant gathering

fishing,

hunting,

other recreation

activities,

and even building and using a few (temporary?) structures.

These options drop specific leasing requirements for cattle grazing, but
develop new requirements that limit the activities oh the allotments, and in
theory require responsible stewardship from the leasee. Most of the proposals .
give the primary management responsibility to the leasee. They base the
agencies' monitoring system for the allotments on some type of sidebar
requirements. This system would allow ranchers to run more cattle than their
current permits

allow, as long as the sidebar, monitoring standards were

met.

Options also vary as to the length of the leases, but most would increase it to
fifteen or twenty years. Proposals also vary as to whether and how previous
leasees might get compensation for their allotments' improvements and permit
value. Most everyone agrees that free market variable use allotments would
bring in considerably more income for the government. Its proponents
usually project a somewhat reduced cost to the agencies, as they would not

.
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have to develop AMPs, but would have the costs from developing the initial
sidebars. Skeptics of the new system believe that developing these sidebars
would be complicated and costly, and that it would actually increase the
management complexity and costs to the agencies.
As the specific proposals vary, so do the reactions to them, and the
expectations as to their consequences for both ranch viability and ecologically
related concerns. Reactions to these types of proposals also seem mixed among
both the ranching

and environmental communities.

Concerns

about what

types of uses would be allowed, economic issues, sidebar development, and
management implementation
projections

come from both

sectors. Proponents

with

of positive financial benefits, less government intrusion,

and

healthier ecosystems come from within both communities and from others. It
is my suspicion that government managers would not be happy about having
to implement any of these proposals.

Grassbanking
Gras shanking is a new management tool that the agencies have begun to
test. It can be used in conjunction with various other reform measures.
Grassbanking

allows temporary grazing on unused allotments, to replace

forage from allotments that are being rested to benefit ecological and riparian
health. This allows the ranchers with allotments that are being rested

to

maintain their AUM levels at or near their previous levels. Sometimes the use
of a grassbank allotment is given to the rancher after a rest is required, and
sometimes it is used as a tool to negotiate a voluntary rest.
Since resting allotments comes through an agency decision, it does
actually change the legal requirement

not

that allotments be grazed. Nor does it

affect leasing or monitoring requirements. It is, however, a tool that allows
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flexibility in management. It can be suggested by environm entalists,
ranchers,

or the

agencies,

thus

encouraging

m anagem ent responsibility

by

all parties. Also, as AUM levels remain generally stable, grassbanking has
little

effect on government finances.
Ranchers generally approve of grassbanking as a tool that maintains ranch

viability and local economic health, while also improving habitat. Since it
works to maintain stable AUM levels, they think that it helps maintain permit
values. They also believe that it reduces the possibility of floral decadence,
because it prevents allotments from going completely without grazing.
^ Environmentalists have mixed opinions about grassbanking. Although it
encourages the resting of allotments that need restoration, many do not like
the fact that previously abandoned allotments are returned to grazing, thus
preventing what they predict would be the return to a totally natural state. On
the other hand, they realize that some of these allotments could be legally
returned to full grazing in any case, and tend to support grassbanking in
those

instances.

C om pensation

For

Forced

AUM

R eduction

The acceptability of compensating ranchers for forced AUM reductions has
already been discussed in the last chapter, but could it be successfully
implemented and how does it relate to the other issues that come up in grazing
reform? If such a compensation system were to be set up, two additional
questions would have to be answered: "How would compensation levels be set?"
and "Could the money be raised?"
When determining the amount ranchers would get compensated for each
lost AUM, in order to save on administrative costs, and to prevent disputes, it
should be done in a manner that is as a simple and clear as possible. Individual
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assessments of allotment permit values would surely be expensive and
inconsistent. Individual assessments also make allotments look more like
property, and would thus reinforce the belief that the compensation is for
some kind of taking (of the right to a grazing permit). Any compensation that
could be viewed as a taking would almost universally be opposed by
e n v i r o n me n t a l i s t s .

'

To avoid these problems, the compensation would need to be written into law
as a transitional fund, to provide either for alternative forage, or replacement
^income. Consider the simple method of setting compensation at a uniform
level, say $75 for seasonal AUMs and $125 for year-long AUMs. These
suggestions are at the higher end of studied permit values, but setting them
high would make the program more acceptable to ranchers.
It could also make sense to set compensation levels through a clear formula.
This might start at a lower level that was modified by a rancher's level of
dependence on federal allotments. For example, $50 for seasonal AUMs plus $50
multiplied by the percent level of dependence would work out to $60 for 20%
dependence and $90 for 80% dependence. A similar system could be set up that
had one base level that was modified to take account for the exact length of the
season of use for the allotment. A formula could even be developed that took
into account both dependency levels and the season of use.
An acceptable compensation system also needs to set aside money to
compensate the states or counties for lost grazing receipts. With the current
fee. level of $1.36/AUM, that would be 680 /AUM for BLM allotments outside of
grazing districts, 170/AUM for BLM allotments inside grazing districts, and
340/AUM for Forest Service allotments. To make up for this, $10 invested at an
annual interest rate of 6.8% would earn 680/AUM per year, $5 would earn
340/AUM, and $2.50 would earn 170/AUM. Each of these figures is relatively
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insignificant compared to the money going to the rancher. It might also make
sense to allow the state or county to take complete control of that fund after
perhaps

ten

years.

How much money would it take to compensate for all forced AUM reductions?
That of course depends on what reductions were required. Even under the
Livestock Production Alternative in RR '94 DEIS, the agencies were expected to
decrease total AUMs by approximately 2.4 million over the next 20 years. For
quick figuring, assume the average compensation to be about $100/AUM, so
those reductions would require $240 million or $12 million/year. The
Environmental Enhancement Alternative in the RR '94 DEIS would have
required a total decrease of approximately 6.7 million AUMs, so those
reductions would require $670 million or $33.5 million/year. For this
investigation, perhaps it would be best, to use the figures for the Proposed
Action of the RR '94 DEIS, with a 4.6 million AUM reduction over 20 years,
requiring

$23

m illion/year.2 2

To put these figures for the program in perspective, one could look briefly
at the costs of the Conservation Reserve Program. That program is designed to
protect environmentally sensitive lands and erosive soils. This year the USDA
accepted 5.9 million new acres into the Conservation Reserve Program at
$45.15 per acre (Montana Grain Growers). Just this new acreage will cost

\
the

program $266 million per year. The current total in program is 29.9 million
acres, and although the acreage for last year was enrolled at $39.39, the total
cost of the program is still close to $1 billion per year.

22 The Livestock Production Alternative reduction of 2.4 million is
approximately 11% of the BLM and Forest Service total of 22 million. The
Environmental Enhancement A lternative reduction of 6.7 million is
approximately 30%, and the Proposed Action reduction of 4.6 million is
approxim ately 21%.
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Before finally looking at where this money would come from, it is important
to look at what effects forced compensation has on other reform issues.
Compared to current management, it would generally stabilize the ranching
industry and communities, because it could be set up to maintain revenues
from grazing receipts and gives some money to the ranchers for replacement
forage. Many ranchers will still argue that replacement forage is not
available, or that the compensation is not enough to pay for replacement
forage in the long term. While that might be true in some cases, those
ranchers might consider simply reducing their herds and putting that money
in the bank or investing it. If they were compensated $1,200 for a 12 AUM
reduction (enough to. feed one cow and a calf for a year) at 6.8% annual
interest, they would bring in $81.60, which is comparable to the average
annual profits from one cow.
If there was compensation for forced AUMs, permit values would generally
stabilize to a level close to the level of compensation, again stabilizing the
ranching industry

arid increasing the

security

of the financial community

that loans them money. If fee levels remain stable, forced compensation would
J

initially cost the agencies more because

fee receipts would go down

compensation money would be added to

the budget. However, some

and the

management costs, include money spent on appeals, lawsuits, improvements
and monitoring, would go down, and in the long term, after

grazing levels

stabilized, the total costs to the agencies would go down.
Under a forced compensation system, leasing requirements, management
responsibility,

monitoring

requirements

and the requirem ent to

graze

would

not be greatly affected. Although reductions would be required, few allotments
would end up without any grazing, so there would be little concern over the
potential for floral decadence. Debate would continue as to what level of
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reductions were necessary to deal with the effects of overgrazing; protect
habitat, and maintain recreation values, but it is likely that resistance to AUM
reductions would go down.
So, where would the compensation money come from? Probably from a
combination Of sources. Money from private and nonprofit sources is one
possibility. Some of the money could come from a surcharge on grazing fees.
Fifty cents per AUM . would initially raise over $10 million per year. Although a
surcharge would encounter initial resistance, it is likely to lessen as the
ranchers realize that such an increase is much like allotment insurance, and
that all the money is returning to public lands ranchers. The money saved
from appeals, lawsuits and eventual reductions in the agencies’ personnel and
monitoring budgets should also be filtered into the compensation program.
Some of the compensation money should be tied to the reasons for the
reductions. If reductions are required for deer or elk forage, or to protect fish
habitat or an endangered species, they could be funded from the various Fish
*

and W ildlife Agencies' budgets or other money designated for protecting
endangered species. Finally, perhaps the most likely source would be from an
amendment to the Land and W ater Conservation Fund,

V o lu n ta ry

A llo tm en t

R etirem en t

The acceptability of compensating ranchers for voluntarily retiring their
allotments has been discussed in the previous chapter, but it also raises
• s.

questions as to if and how it might be successfully implemented. The answers
to the questions of compensation levels and sources are similar to those of
forced reductions, but the voluntary compensation plan affects some of the
other management issues very differently. This system also raises some
different questions. How many ranchers would actually take advantage of it,
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and what would happen if more

ranchers wanted to retire allotments

there was money available? Also,

would the agencies have veto power over

allotment retirement, and could an

than

allotment ever be grazed again, even if it

was not actually leased as part of the allotment system?
There is little doubt that the agencies would have to develop rules that
prioritized which types of allotments they would fund first for retirement.
These priorities might include allotments that are expensive to monitor and
manage, or those in priority habitat or heavily used recreation areas, or those
without AMPs. I

suspect that the agencies would want to keep open the option ■

of putting some o f the allotments that got retired into a grassbanking system,
in order to alleviate overgrazing on neighboring allotments. A voluntary
retirement system

would also more likely be acceptable if the owners

of

ranches who wanted to retire their allotments were required to make a
commitment to limit the subdivision of their private
This system

would

land.

not change leasing or monitoring requirements,

but

would obviously end the requirement that grazing continue for the retired
allotments. It would also change the agencies' management responsibility,
since the monitoring requirements for retired allotments would change to
include preventing the potential for floral decadence.
Any voluntary reduction system should also include a fund to replace
grazing receipts similar to the one discussed previously. The money for
voluntary allotment retirement is much more likely to come from private and
nonprofit sources. In many cases, states, counties and cities would benefit
from the retirement of certain allotments and would conceivably help finance
their retirement, as would some federal agencies besides the Forest Service and
BLM, if it benefited their goals. If it were allowed, both the BLM and Forest.
Service would undoubtedly help finance the retirement of problem allotments,
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but certainly not to the extent that they would finance forced reductions,
unless Congress voted additional money to the program.
Although it would probably benefit the agencies to have a clear and
consistent compensation level along the lines of those discussed in the
previous section, for other federal agencies, other governmental bodies, and
for private interests, the compensation levels negotiated for allotment
retirement would vary considerably, depending on the goals of the both the
ranchers and those who fund the retirement. If retirem ent became
widespread, than permit values are likely to at least stabilize at their current
levels, if not increase, which would also please both ranching communities
and their banks.
Overall, a voluntary retirement system should improve ranch viability and
local community health, because the least economical ranches would most
•
.
<■
likely be retired first. Additionally, it could generally improve habitat,
ecological health, and recreation
econom ic

opportunities.

opportunities, along with creating new

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION:
Any Grazing Reform Must Deal With Permit Value

THE EXISTENCE AND INFLUENCE OF PERMIT VALUE
As the evidence from the previous chapters indicates, there is really no
debate over the existence of permit value. It can be documented historically,
starting soon after the creation of the allotment system and continuing into
the present. It is recognized by the Internal Revenue Service and the Farm
Credit Administration. It has been documented by economists, both in theory
and practice, through surveys and modeling of ranch real estate values: It is
also almost universally recognized by anyone familiar with the allotment
system .
There is still debate, however, oyer the importance and influence of permit
Value. It clearly has practical significance, as most ranchers expect to recoup
their investment in permit value if they decide to sell their ranch. Since it is
taxed as an inheritance, it can also play a part in whether a rancher's heirs
will continue ranching or sell the ranch, For individual ranchers, permit
value is widely variable in its direct impacts. For ranchers who do not intend
to sell their ranches and are not threatened by AUM cuts, it is effectively
nonexistent. For others, that is far from the truth. As one historian points out:
Many ranchers take almost continuous non-use for a significant part of
their permitted numbers, but fiercely resist all suggestions that these
excessive numbers (which they know to be excessive) be cut, because of
their desire to retain the potential sale value of the larger permits.
(Calif 274)
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For ranchers who are faced with AUM reductions and recognize that they may
sell their ranches at some point or if their allotments are used as collateral,
permit

value can be extremely significant in their decision-making.

The level of direct impacts of permit value on a specific rancher does not
necessarily directly translate into the level of political significance it has for
that rancher. A rancher may not even have an allotment, but might still
support maintaining grazing levels and permit values at their current levels.
A lternately, a few ranchers dependent on allotments threatened by reductions
may still support reforms that reduce the importance of permit value. Non
ranchers,

including

bankers,

environm entalists,

and

taxpayers

in

general,

also have a wide range of opinions about permit value that affect their
political stance on managing public lands.
The results of the survey undertaken for this thesis indicate that the
political importance of permit value varies. Its political influence is reflected
in the extent it increases the resistance of ranchers to reductions in their
AUM levels. By extension, the extent that ranchers and their supporters
attempt to use their political influence to maintain their AUM levels and
permit

value also varies. The

is not

something that can be

objective manner,
potentially

but clearly

extent that permit value affects ranchers politics
determined in any absolute or completely

'

it has some influence, and that influence is

of great importance.

It can also be argued that in politics, an issue that is extremely important to
:

-

1

a small sector often becomes an important influence to policy makers. If that
is the case, considering that permit value is a major motivating factor for some
ranchers (and bankers) then that influence is at least significant, and
potentially a major factor in the politics of the management of public land
g ra z in g .
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PERMIT VALUE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ANY REFORM PROPOSALS
Permit value is clearly an important enough issue that it should be
considered, and hopefully dealt with, in any attempts to reform the public land
grazing allotment system. In general, reforms that would reduce the total
permit value without compensation should expect opposition from the
ranching

community.

Reforms

that reduce

permit value through

f

compensation can expect favorable but mixed reviews and some reluctant
support from both environmentalists and from the public lands ranchers.
Reforms (or the current status quo) that leave the total level of permit values
generally unchanged can expect support from the public land ranchers, but
opposition from, environmentalists. All of these options are likely to receive
mixed reviews from other sectors
,.A politically acceptable reform is likely to have several of the following
characteristics. The reform should be as simple and clear as possible, so it is
understood by all the parties affected and leaves little room for
misinterpretation. It should strike a good balance between the goals of
ranchers and environmentalists; although it might not be the favorite of
everyone, it should have little outright opposition. It should foster continued
and broader communication between the different groups concerned with the
grazing system. It should increase management options. Finally, it should
work as a gradual social evolution with slow but consistent changes, and not
force the issues quickly.
Another critical factor to consider in a grazing reform proposal is how those
proposing and supporting it would be perceived by their peers. The issue of
grazing on public lands has been in dispute for over one hundred years, with
the driving forces in the dispute often led by those with the most extreme
views. A few have become completely hardened in their views and will always
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refuse to compromise. For’ many others, although not complete absolutists, any
compromise would be difficult at best. For some individuals, supporting any
compromise could mean losing the support of their friends and neighbors—
losing face. For some organizations, it could mean losing members or financial
s u p p o rt.
The ranching and environmental communities both have distinct, core, but
related positions that need to remain uncompromised to allow any negotiations
to proceed,

artd for the participants to save face. Though hard-core

environm entalists will resist any reform that further subsidizes or
compensates the ranchers, for those willing to compromise, the line is drawn
at reform that makes grazing into a right, or that sets up allotments so that
they are subject to
reform that

takings claims. The hard-core ranchers will resist any

removes any land from the allotment system, but for those willing

to compromise, the line is drawn at any reform that removes land from the
system without some form of compensation.
It often appears that these positions are irreconcilable, and in practice, it
might be impossible to find an acceptable compromise. The two reforms
systems discussed previously that set up compensation systems without setting
up any new rights to grazing or allotments are clearly on the fence between
the two extremes. For some environmentalists, it really would not make much
difference that the compensation money for forced reductions is for
"transitional

forage" or "transitional income." They will still consider it

too

much like a taking. If is it stated properly, the courts, on the other hand, are
.

' r>,

unlikely to consider a transitional allocation much of a precedent to bolster
other takings claims! It would be more like food stamps or unemployment
insurance. Although such a system might seem to play into the hands of the
ranchers, and satisfy all but the hard-core, the ranchers are still making a
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"hidden" concession, since compensation systems would almost certainly make
it much more difficult to fight AUM reductions with economic arguments,
either in the courts or with the agencies.
A politically negotiated agreement between the ranching and
environm ental communities

would clearly take some compromise.

considered the "bottom line" positions, the other important

Having

element to consider

in bargaining is the real goals of each group. Although more than a few
environmentalists want to get rid of ranching on public lands, the more
common goal is to reduce ranching's impacts to order to improve the health of
the land. Similarly, although more than a few ranchers want to make public
land grazing a permanent right, the more common goals is to insure their
economic viability'and their way of life. Can both of these goals

be reached in

some agreement, even if it does not satisfy the absolutists?
Perhaps they can, as talk of different proposals for new

types of grazing

reforms appears to be increasing, and many proposals include some type of
.i

compensation scheme. (See Appendixes C and D.) If this talk was coming only
from environmentalists, it probably would not be very significant, but it is
also being heard ,from some ranchers, and also from some politicians whose
main focus is cutting the budget. Despite these rumblings, it would still be a
surprise if the issue gets much attention by the general public, but these ideas
are gaining the attention of environmentalists and land-use groups. It is
between these groups that the real debate is beginning to take shape, and
where it needs to take place, if these new options that prioritize the
consideration of permit value are to change the ongoing political debate over
grazing on public lands.
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A HYBRID SOLUTION
In the light of the influence of permit value and the often conflicting
interests

of the

environmental

and ranching com m unities,

what

recommendations can be given to the policy makers that might conceivably be
politically acceptable? The
number of tradeoffs

option favored by the author incorporates a

and includes some of the options discussed earlier. It

focuses on gradually reducing the influence of permit value without undue
economic impacts on the part of the ranchers. It also recognizes the
importance of the current national trend towards lowering the total AUMs in
the allotment system, and that this trend is expected to continue. It is
fundamentally based on a

combination of the tw o-plans that compensate

ranchers for forced

reductions and for the voluntary retirement of

AUM

a llo tm e n ts.
The compensation for forced AUM reductions (that are not due to
overgrazing) appears to be grudgingly favored by both ranchers and
environmentalists, although to some degree more by the ranchers. In the
hybrid plan the rancher would be compensated unless there was evidence to
show that the rancher had violated the agency proscribed AUM level or season
of use on their allotment more than once in the previous five years.
Compensation would . also not be given to foreign-owned ranches or ranchers
who refused to sign their AMPs or any other required contract with the
agencies. The amount of compensation should be such that a prudent investor
could replace the lost income from the sale of their livestock, based on the
average sale price of livestock in their state for the previous five years. The
money to finance this should come in part from the government’s expected
savings, in part from the Land and Water Conservation Fund and in part from
the 500 surcharge on allotments discussed previously.
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The other major element of this hybrid proposal is a voluntary retirement
system that is not funded by either ranchers or (except in unusual
circum stances)

by

the federal

governm ent.2 3 The retirement could be funded

by state or local governments, nonprofit groups or private interests, when it is
in there interest to do so. There would be no specific amount

required per AUM

for voluntary retirement, except

be established to

the requirement that a fund

replace the amount of the fee that was going to the state or county. The system
for voluntary retirement need not be rigid. Following are some suggestions
that would allow more flexibility in retirem ent arraignments.
The voluntary allotment system could also be set up to allow for some
allotment trading as part of the process. For instance, if a rancher was ready to
retire, but had an allotment without prized habitat, and a nearby rancher still
wanted to ranch, but his allotment was coveted by environmentalists for its
fish habitat, trading would allow the first rancher to retire with
compensation, the second to continue ranching, and the environm entalists to
protect the habitat they consider most important.
A retirement contract might also incorporate a provision that stated to what
degree the allotment could be used as part of a grassbanking system. A
rancher might be more willing

to put an allotment in semi-retirement, where

it could be used every second or third year at half its previous level as part of a
grassbanking system. The agencies could use that extra forage to rest other
allotments, or put it up for bid. Such an agreement should designate the money
from auctioned forage to the forced reduction compensation fund.
Part of a retirement agreement might also be combined with putting an
easement on the private part of the land, or some limit on the extent that it
23 It might occur if an agency decides that it is cheaper to pay for an
allotment's retirement than it would be to do the monitoring, range
improvements and paperwork for that allotment.
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could be subdivided. This could be used to prevent ranch owners who were
about to

"sell-out" to developers from making additional money.

would have the decision-making power

The agencies

for allotments abandoned without

such

an agreement (by the developer or others). These allotments could be rested,
retired, traded, put in a grassbanking system, or allotted through competitive
bidding, thus preventing them

from regaining

perm it value.

Another trade-off might ease the restrictions whereby sm a ll' (perhaps 640
acres or less) and entirely enclosed allotments could be sold or traded to
ranchers,

after public comment and agreement by the agencies. This would

give the ranchers

some assurance that their investments

and general ranch

structure could be maintained and improved.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE REFORM
Considering the surprising range of viewpoints of both ranchers and
environmental activists found in the interviews, it is likely that the debate
over possible new reforms is unlikely to fall along the traditional lines.
likely that those with the most extreme

viewpoints will

reject any

management option that smells of compromise. Since these

It is
new

elements are often

the most vocal on both sides, any acceptable reform will have to have good
support from those who are less extreme, and some of these "centrists" will
have to take on vocal roles to educate others on the implications of these
re fo rm s .
Still, even some of the not-so-extreme environmentalists are likely to
' the "hybrid" proposal above and initially reject it as overly generous to
ranchers. Before doing so, however, they should seriously consider the
"hidden" concession mentioned earlier. If this proposal or some other
compensation plan is put into effect, without any other changes to

look at
the
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environmental laws, then some of the main arguments that ranchers use to
resist cuts in grazing levels would be undermined. That undercutting is likely
to lead many ranchers to resist the proposal. One would no longer find sections
of environmental impact statements

that declared that management options

that required AUM cuts would cause significant impacts to the ranchers and
their local communities. Ranchers often argue that these changes will, "Put us
out of business," or "Take away our way of life." With a voluntary retirement
option that allowed for allotment trading, the ranchers going out of business
would almost exclusively be those who are ready to retire anyway. Indeed,
there would still be ranchers who have to reduce the numbers they run, but if
there was compensation for forced reductions, most, if not all of their income
would be replaced.
With compensation measures in place, undoubtedly the agencies, the courts,
the public and the lawmakers would look at the ranching community with less
sympathy when reacting to situations that apparently placed w ildlife habitat
or water quality ahead of a rancher’s livelihood or the local community's
economy. Compensation measures not only move public lands away from use
for grazing and towards other uses, they also make environmental laws more
effective by reducing

their conflicts with economic considerations.

So why would any rancher buy into a system that one rancher describes as,
"A sugar-coated cyanide pill?" Why would they accept a plan that might reduce
their political

influence

and increase the effectiveness

of environmental

laws? For those who believe that grazing rarely or never causes
environmental impacts or even improves the land, or who philosophically
oppose seeing any land that is grazed go to other uses, then it is likely that
there is no argument that will influence them. For some, however, the
economic arguments that come with compensation make sense. Even if the
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compensation is not actually for a taking, they are still getting what many
have been arguing in favor of for years: compensation for AUM reductions.
For others, who have been entrenched with environmentalists and the
agencies for years, if not decades, it provides the light at the end of the tunnel.
There is already a growing movement, including the BLM's Resource Advisory
Councils and other private groups, towards negotiating these conflicts rather
than continuing to battle in court. For the ranchers who prefer to spend their
time ranching, rather than on law or politics, compensation plans are a path
y

■

towards opening up communication and towards resolving these . long-time
c o n flic ts .
Other ranchers see the changing social patterns that could ultimately erode
their base of resistance to these changes. The ranching community is

aging,

and not as many in the next generations are willing to take over the ranch.
Population is

increasing, and ranchers are selling out, and with that

increase

comes more interest in using public land for recreation—and water. They see
‘
*
that if public land ranching is to continue, it will have to evolve. Some of these
plans allow for that evolution, without bringing financial ruin to the
ranching

com m unity.

The last reason that ranchers might be willing to accept these types of plans
is that the public land ranchers have been gradually losing a war of attrition
with environmentalists in the judicial system. There are good reasons that
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act sound like dirty
words to ranchers, as environmental groups are effectively using these laws
in court to reduce grazing levels, especially in the Southwest.
Those victories bring on

the question from some environmentalists,

"We're

winning. Why

should we stop now?" They see that a solution that incorporates

com pensation,

although

possibly

leading

to

significantly

reduced

grazing
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levels, would not lead to its abolition. After reductions are made on

the most J

environmentally sensitive lands, it is likely to be harder to reduce grazing
levels further, either politically or through the courts. Also, their focus would
have to change towards raising money to lure more ranchers into potential
voluntary

retirem ent,

and

many

have

philosophical

disagreem ents

with

primarily having to raise funds, as they believe that in doing so they will have
to "buy into the system."
These environmentalists often do not step back to recognize how these
victories in the courts, although significant, have come slowly, at great costs,
and without real guarantees that the courts, the agencies, or the lawmakers
might someday sweep them away. Victories of that nature actually work to
increase the political resistance of the ranching community. They fail to see,
or do not believe, that lasting change is more likely to come with a solution
that is acceptable to all the parties concerned.
As with many of the reform measures discussed in this work, the
implementation of the hybrid solution would take an act of Congress.
Particularly given the current configuration of the Congress, that calls for a
note of caution. In discussing two other possible reform measures, Larry Tuttle
eloquently

frames

the

problem:

If [Senator] Wyden were to introduce the Plan as has been suggested,
what realcontrol would he be
able to exercise? Wyden has neither the
disposition nor the power base to exercise control over amendments or
mark-ups, unlike [Senator] Domenici, who has the disposition and power
and a long involvement in grazing issues.
The

Congress is made up of individuals with a wide variety of political beliefs

and

motivations,

may of whom have

little personal interest in public land

grazing. The legislative process is also rife with
legislation

as

introduced.

W ith

pro-grazing

tradeoffs and rarely passes

congressm en currently
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controlling the land use committees, there is little doubt that they would use
their influence to make changes in any legislation that did not please them.
With these political realities in mind, it is recommended that no reform
measure be introduced to Congress without general support from both the
ranching and environmental communities. Also, it is recommended that the
legislation introduced be as simple as possible, so that any changes made in the
legislative process are easily noticed and thus easily debated by both sides.

SU M M A R Y
This work looks at the permit value of public land grazing allotments
historically, legally, economically, politically, and through a survey of
interested parties. It finds that permit value clearly exists, has some political
significance to most ranchers and great political important to a few, and that it
should be an issue of concern in any attempt to reform public land grazing. It
examines what elements might be important in order to find reforms that
might be acceptable to both the ranching and environm ental communities,
reviews other issues that could be important for potential reforms and then
analyzes a number of possible reforms for their potential political viability.
Finally, it offers a reform package that the author believes might be
acceptable to both of those communities. That package, however, comes with a
number of caveats: that there is no reform that is acceptable to all sides, that
any reform should be carefully considered and introduced into Congress with
extreme caution, and that prior to introduction the reform should have
significant support of both contingencies, since Congress regularly makes
significant changes to legislation that is introduced. Despite these caveats,
grazing reform directed at reducing the influence of permit value should be
u n d e r ta k e n .
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONS TO THE PERMITTEES
1) Please describe in brief your ranch and ranching experience. When was
the ranch bought? How big is it, in both acres and carrying capacity? What
percentage of capacity is federal? What percentage of the family income does
it bring in? How long have you and your family been ranching? Is there
anything else that you want to include?
2) How many AUMs is your allotment(s) currently permitted for? What is its
actual use? Has this changed over the years?
3) How do you feel about the current allotment system?
4) Do you feel that you or your family paid for your allotment with your
ranch? How much? How much do you feel it is worth now?
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel
about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to
overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an
allotm ent for com pensation?
QUESTIONS TO THE NONPERMITTEES
1) Please describe in brief your ranch and ranching experience. When was
the ranch bought? How big is it, in both acres and carrying capacity? What
percentage of the family income does it bring in? How long have you and your
family been ranching? Is there anything else that you want to include?
2) Have you ever had an allotment? If so, how many AUMs was your
allotment(s) permitted for? Was the actual use different? Did it change over
the years? What percentage of that ranch's capacity was federal?
3) How do you feel about the current allotment system?
4) Do you feel that ranchers pay for their allotments when they
buy their
ranch? How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth now as part of
the real estate value of a ranch? Has that changed over the years?
5) How big of an influence do you feel the real estate value of grazing permits
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers
for forced
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel
ab o u t, a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to
overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an
allotm ent for com pensation?
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QUESTIONS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS
1) Please describe in brief your experience with the public land grazing
allotment system. Have you ever owned or worked on a ranch? Is there
anything else that you want to include?
2) How do you feel about the current allotment system? How have you feelings
about this system changed over the years?
3) What, if any, changes would you like to see in the allotment system?
4) Do you feel that ranchers pay for their allotments when they buy their
ranch? How much do you feel a federally leased AUM is worth now as part of
the real estate value of a ranch? Has that changed over the years?
5) How big of an influence dp you feel the real estate value of grazing permits
is in the resistance of ranchers to cuts in their AUM levels?
6) How would you feel about a system that compensated ranchers for forced
AUM reductions due to the prioritization of other uses? How would you feel
about a system that compensated ranchers for forced AUM reductions due to
Overgrazing? How about a system that allowed a willing rancher to retire an
allotm ent for com pensation?
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEWEES
Name
Ranchers

Location
Allotments

with

MT
E n n is
E m m ett
ID
NM
. R osw ell
C entral Point OR
M orenci
AZ
M c A llis te r
MT
A lm o n t
CO

Bob Germann
B rad L ittle
Bud Eppers
D alton Straus
Jeffrey M enges
John Crum ley
Ken Spann

Ranchers

Affiliation

Without

The Germann Ranch
Little Land and Livestock Company
New M exico Public Lands Council
Straus Ranches
Slash Hook Cattle Co.
M adison Valley Ranchlands Group
Spann Ranches

Allotments

Bill Bowersox
Harold Yoder
John W ard
Ken Rodgers
M ichael C urren
Thomas W Brown
Vernon Sharp

M c A llis te r
K arv al
Klam ath Falls
Yuma
W olf Creek
H e rsh e y
B ran so n

MT
CO
OR
CO
MT
NE
CO

F a rm e r/R a n c h e r
R ancher
W ard's H erefords
Wagon Wheel Ranch
Sold ranch after interview
Owns farm /ranch with three sons
The Sharp Cattle Ranch

Las Cruces
Provo
C o rv a llis
Las Cruces
Logan
L aram ie
M isso u la

NM
UT
OR
NM
UT
WY
MT

New M exico State University
Brigham Young University
Oregon State University
New M exico State University
Utah State U niversity
University of W yoming
University of M ontana

W a sh in g to n
M isso u la
A lb u q u e r q u e
L ew istow n
S p a rk s
B illin g s
G u n n iso n
L ew istow n

DC
MT
NM
MT
NV
MT
CO
MT

Reno
H a ile y
E v an sto n
Reno
C rested Butte
Silver City
E ugene

NV
ID
WY
NV
CO
NM
OR

L ew istow n
L ew istow n
A lb u q u e r q u e
D illo n
T ucson
L ew istow n

MT
MT
NM
MT
AZ
MT

A ca d em ics
A llen Torell
Dell G ardner
Fred O berm iller.
Jerry H olechek
John Workman
Larry Van Tassell
R obert E hrhart

Federal

Land

Managers

Berwyn Brown
Bruce Fox
Gerald Henke
Jam es Owings
Jim Nelson
Larry H am ilton
M ark H atcher
Terry H olst

U.S.F.S.
U.S.F.S. Northern Region
/ U.S.F.S.
BLM
U.S.F.S.
BLM
U.S.F.S.
BLM

E n v ir o n m e n ta lists
Dan Hienz
Jon Marvel
M arty Short
Rose Strickland
Sue Navy
Susan Schock
Tom Pringle

C o n s e rv a tio n is t
Idaho W atersheds Project
. C o n s e rv a tio n is t
Sierra Club
High C ountry C itizens' Alliance
Gila Watch
Eugene Hiking Club

O th ers
Barry Smith
Dean Comes
Jim W ells
John Phelan
M ark Muro
Sid Grover

A p p r a is e r
F irst National Bank
Farm Credit Services
Farm Credit Services
Arizona Daily Star
Lewistown Real Estate
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APPENDIX C
THE RANGELAND RETIREMENT ACT
A Proposal for Real Rangeland Reform
Drafted by Jeff Burgess
Whereas livestock grazing is permitted by the federal government on public
lands administered by the USDA's Forest Service and the USDI's Bureau of Land
Management; and whereas grazing cannot be continued on many of these
lands

w ithout unacceptable

levels

of environm ental

degradation,

unresolvable

conflicts with other uses of the land, or excessive investment by the public in
the implementation of adequate livestock management; then the following
legislative proposal is offered to allow for the equitable retirement of the
aforem entioned

lands

from

livestock

grazing:

1. All livestock management projects on

public lands wherein the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) planning process has been engaged will
include among the management alternatives to be analyzed a "no-grazing"
alternative. This

alternative,

in addition

to documenting the environmental

and economic benefits to the public of discontinuing grazing, will include a
professional assessment of the market value of the affected grazing permit.
(Legally, federal grazing permits are riot

private property and have no market

value. They can be revoked by federal land managers at any time for good
cause. Traditionally, however, the market value of a ranch's private base
property is inflated to reflect the assumption that the government will reissue
the grazing permit to the new owner when the property is sold. Thus, the
market value of a grazing permit is the difference between the market value
of a ranch's private base property with the grazing permit attached, minus the
value of the property without the permit.)
2. Upon the completion of the NEPA analysis, a grazing permittee may opt to
voluntarily

surrender their grazing permit and receive paym ent from

agency equal to the permit's assessed market value. The offer

the

and/or

disbursement of this financial compensation in no way implies or infers that
possession of a grazing permit gives the holder a property right on federal
lands. The intent of the money is to serve as Transitional Economic Assistance

(TEA) to the former permit

■ : ,
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holder. If the permittee declines to voluntarily

surrender the grazing permit, the responsible federal land manager may still
choose to implement the no-grazing alternative if it's determined that it's the
management alternative that

best serves the

public interest. The former

grazing permit holder will still receive the appropriate amount of TEA if this
happens.
3. Any rancher holding a federal grazing permit may, at any time, choose to
procure their own professional assessment of the market value of their
permit. The permittee may then submit the assessment to the agency in order
to voluntarily surrender their permit and receive the appropriate amount of
TEA.
4. The permitting of livestock grazing shall be suspended on all lands for
which a grazing permit has

been retired, as

25 years. At the end of this time period, no

described above, for a minimum of
livestock grazing shall be permitted

to resume until a NEPA analysis is completed and it is determined the
resumption of grazing would be in the public interest.
5. Congress will create a Range Retirement Fund (RRF) to provide a source of
money for the Forest Service and the BLM to disburse TEA. The RRF will
receive a minimum annual appropriation Of $50 million* for as long as it is
deemed necessary to continue the program. Private individuals, organizations
(such as conservation groups), and states will also be allowed to contribute to
the RRF.
6. Federal land managers will be responsible for prioritizing grazing
allotments under their jurisdiction so that, in the event available RRF funds
are insufficient, TEA will be first be disbursed to facilitate the suspension of
grazing on those allotments with the most important resources.
7. This legislation would in no other way alter the existing federal laws
regarding the permitting of livestock grazing on public lands.
*This is the amount of the deficit the federal government reported it incurred
managing livestock grazing on public lands in 1990.

'
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APPENDIX D
The

V oluntary

R etirem ent

O ption

Taken from "The Voluntary Retirem ent Option for
Federal Public Land Grazing Perm ittees." by Andy Kerr.
It would be easier— and more just—for the federal government to fairly compensate the
perm it holders as it reduces cattle num bers. Since the governm ent spends substantially
more than it receives for grazing, in a few years the savings realized by reducing livestock
numbers can pay for the compensation.
It would be less expensive— fiscally and politically— or the agency to simply buy out the
problem atic grazing perm its and save extensive planning,
m onitoring, research, public
involvem ent, appeal, litigation and political costs.
Below is a solution to an environmental problem that requires less government
regulation. Federal law should be changed to:

• Allow
g r a z in g

a permit holder to
p erm it.

choose to

not exercise

any or all of

the

There would be no penalty to the permittee for not grazing. This would give desirable
flexibility to ranching operations, decrease livestock grazing dam age, and could also
increase the value of the permit, in
the event the permittee later wished to sell. An
allotm ent with more forage is more
attractive to both prospective livestock operators and
co n serv ation buyers.

• Allow existing perm ittees who hold federal grazing perm its to
sell or donate their grazing
perm it to the federal governm ent,
w hich would then retire the allotm ent.
A permittee could choose to sell to the federal government, receiving fair market value
for their interests in the permit. Money to fund tax deductions and for acquisition of
permits by federal agencies could be funded from the Land and W ater Conservation Fund,
by reducing agency grazing budgets, reallocating US D epartm ent o f A griculture animal
damage control subsidies, by
using the Range Betterm ent Fund, or earm arking that small
fraction of the federal grazing fee that actually makes it into the federal treasury.
Alternatively, a permittee could be paid by an individual environm entalist, a state fish
and wildlife agency, a private conservation organization, a hunting and fishing club, or
anyone else to retire their permit. If it was in the form of a donation tothe government, a
federal incom e tax deduction would be available.

•R eaffirm

that

grazing

the public

lands

is

a

privilege,

not

a right.

Any legislation must expressly state that this change in law in no way increases or
dim inishes any vested interest the perm ittee may or may not have in public land grazing;
that grazing the public lands is still a privilege and any reduction in grazing by the
government is not a compensable loss to the permittee.
Existing laws designed to protect the environment would not change. The administering
agencies could still choose (or be ordered by a court) to reduce, elim inate or further
condition grazing to protect the environm ent or other public values.
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APPENDIX E
PUBLIC LAND GRAZING FEE LEVELS 1909-1997
F.S.*
.05
.05
.05
.05
.04
.03
.04
.09
.09
.10
.10
.10

BLM/Taylor

.11

:i3
.13
.13
.13
.13
.13
.13
.13
.14
.12
.12
.14
.14
.09
.07
1934 .08
1935 .08
1936 .13
1937 .13
1938 .15
1939 .13
1940 .15
1941 .16
1942 .19
1943. .23
1944 .26
1945 .25
1946 .27
1947 .31
1948 .40
1949 .49
1950 .42
1951 .51

.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.08
.08
.08
.08
.12

Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
.1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
197.2
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

From Jacobs; Gardner; Feedstuffs; C ongressional Q uarterly W eekly
*Forest Reserve or Forest Service allotments

F.S.
.64
.54
.35
.37
.35
.34
.39
.50
.51
.46
.46
.49
.46
.46
.51
.56
.56
.60
.60
.78
.80
•91
1.11
1.11
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.93
2.41
2.31
1.86
1.40
1.37
1.35
1.35
1.35
1.54
1.86
1.81
1.97
1.92
1.86
1.86
1.98
1.35
1.35

BLM/Taylor
.12
.12
.12
.15
.15
.15
.15
.22
.22
.19
.19
.30
.30
.30
.33
•33
.33
.44
.44
.64
.66
OO

Year
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

1.00
1.00
1.51
1.51
1.5.1
1.89
2.36
2.31
1.86
1.40
1.37
1.35
1.35
1.35
1.54
1.86
1.81
1.97
1.92
1.86
1.86
1.98
1.35
1.3 5

